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Abstract 
This study investigates the social protection of workers in the platform economy 
at the request of the European Parliament’s Employment and Social Affairs 
Committee. The report reviews literature and previous research on the platform 
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ANNEXES 
ANNEX 1: PLATFORM WORK IN CASE STUDY COUNTRIES 
 
 UNITED KINGDOM 
Platform economy work is well established in the UK, and the UK has been the site of a 
number of recent legal judgements relating to employment status and protection of workers 
in the platform economy. The UK is a liberal market economy, in which there is relatively 
little employment regulation and social protection provisions, when compared to many other 
EU Member States. Employment levels have increased to historically high levels over the last 
two years, and unemployment is falling. However, inactivity levels remain high, and there 
is ongoing debate over the quality of new jobs being created in the UK. In particular, 
there has been a marked rise in contingent, precarious forms of work, and in zero-hours 
contracts (where workers have no guarantee of a regular number of hours of work each 
week). There has been a secular decline in manufacturing employment that has been more 
marked than in many other countries.  Union membership and density has seen long-term 
decline since the 1980s, and collective bargaining coverage has fallen. 
The UK labour market is regulated through labour law, with Acts, Regulations and common 
law providing for a minimum set of employment rights. This includes rights to a minimum 
wage (currently called the National Living Wage), working time limits, the right to paid 
holidays, right to leave for child care, and the right to request flexible working patterns. A 
Pensions Act gives workers the rights to be automatically enrolled in a basic occupational 
pension. There are also rights around equality and fair treatment, enshrined in the Equality 
Act, and regulations ensuring equal treatment for temporary, part-time and agency staff. By 
well-established measures, the UK ranks among the lowest of EU Member States in terms of 
protection for permanent and temporary employees, and these protections have been 
reduced yet further in recent years in some areas, including a reduction in protection against 
dismissal.1  
1.1. Labour market trends 
In March 2017, there were 31.95 million people in work in the UK. This represents a rise of 
380,000 on March 2016.2 According to Eurostat figures, employment rates have risen in the 
UK since 2011, from 73.5 per cent to 77.6 per cent for the last full year of data available in 
2016 (see Table A1). The employment rate for men is 79.5 per cent and for women, 70.2 
per cent.3 In March 2017, there were 1.54 million unemployed people in the UK (people not 
in work but seeking and available to work). This figure fell by 152,000 between March 2016 
and March 2017.4 The unemployment rate in the UK in 2016, according to Eurostat figures, 
stood at 4.8 per cent, down from 8.1 per cent in 2011, and 5.3 per cent in 2015.5 For men, 
the rate is 4.9 per cent and for women, it is 4.6 per cent. The unemployment rate has 
been falling in the UK since late 2011.6 Of the unemployed, 40 per cent have been 
without a job for more than 6 months.   
                                           
1  Brinkley 2015: 1.  
2  ONS 2017: 2.  
3  Ibid.: 2. 
4  Ibid.: 3. 
5  Eurostat 2017a: 1. 
6  ONS 2017: 3.  
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Table A 1: Employment and Unemployment rates in the UK, 2016 
 Employment Rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) 
UK 77.5 4.8 
EU 71.1 8.6 
Source: Eurostat (2017a)7 
One in five of the UK population aged between 20 and 64 is inactive. Male inactivity rates 
have doubled in the UK from 1980-2017 from 8 to 16 per cent. Female inactivity rates rose 
during the economic recession to a peak of 29 per cent in 2011, but have fallen to 26 per 
cent in 2017.8  
There have been long term falls in the proportion of jobs in the manufacturing sector in the 
UK, and the fall is generally recognised to be sharper than in many other EU countries. By 
2017, the proportion of jobs accounted for by the manufacturing sector was 7.7 per 
cent, down from 30 per cent in 1980. In contrast, the proportion of jobs accounted for 
by the services sector increased from 63.2 per cent to 83.6 per cent over the same period.9  
Public sector employment has fallen over the last 25 years, with sharper falls observed 
since the recession of 2009-2010. In December 2016, there were 5.44 million people 
employed in the public sector (17 per cent of the workforce) and 26.41 million people 
employed in the private sector (83 per cent).10 
In terms of the occupational composition of employment, there have been rising employment 
levels and shares for managerial, professional, associate professional and technical jobs. 
Women remain relatively under-represented in managerial and technical occupations 
compared to men in the UK. There have been sharp increases in leisure related and other 
personal service occupations, and women are over-represented in these occupations. There 
have also been declines in the number of workers in administrative and secretarial 
occupations, and most blue collar/manual occupations.11 
Pay levels have stagnated following the economic recession. Average regular pay 
(excluding bonuses) for employees in the UK in March 2017 was £465 per week before tax 
and other deductions from pay, £16 lower than the pre-downturn peak of £481 per week 
recorded for May 2008.12 Earnings growth between January to March 2016 and January to 
March 2017 measured by regular pay fell by 0.2 per cent, the lowest growth rate since 
2014.13 
Part-time employment is relatively high in the UK, compared to other EU countries. A 
quarter of the workforce was employed on a part-time basis in 2016, with only Belgium, 
Germany, Netherlands and Austria having higher rates of part-time employment.14 Nearly 
four out of every ten (38 %) women in the UK work part-time, compared to ten per cent of 
men.15 
                                           
7  Eurostat 2017a: Employment and Unemployment Labour Force Survey Data: Tables, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/main-tables. 
8  ONS 2017: 4. 
9  Ibid.: 5. 
10  Ibid.: 6. 
11  UKCES 2016: 12. 
12  ONS 2017: 7. 
13  Ibid.: 4. 
14  Eurostat 2015: 3. 
15  Ibid.: 3. 
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Table A 2: Part-time, temporary and self-employment in the UK, 2016 
 Part-time 
employment (%) 
Temporary 
employment (%) 
Self-employment (%)  
UK 25.2 5.1 14 
EU 19.5 12.0 14 
Source: Eurostat (2017a); Eurostat (2017b)16  
Temporary employment in the UK stood at 5.1 per cent (1.5 million workers) in 2016, and 
this figure is seen as relatively low in comparison to many EU countries.17 However, this 
figure has risen over recent years, and this aggregate figure also masks significant rises in 
individual forms of temporary working. Temporary agency working, in particular, where many 
platform economy workers are located, has risen sharply since the 1980s, from 0.25 per cent 
of the workforce to between 2 per cent of the workforce, according to Labour Force Survey 
figures.18   
Self-employment – a key form of working in the platform economy – is also relatively high 
in the UK compared to some of the other EU countries considered in this report, although the 
figure of 14 per cent is the same as the average for the EU as a whole.19 Fourteen per cent 
of all people in work were engaged on a self-employed basis in 2016.20 This figure represents 
4.78 million people and has risen by 82,000 over the last year.21 Indeed, the rise in self-
employment has been particularly marked in the UK, both during and after the recent 
recession, with many arguing that “involuntary” self-employment (those undertaking self-
employment because they cannot find another job), in particular, has risen sharply.22  
Union membership has been falling in the UK since 1979. While membership levels have 
stabilised in recent years, the latest annual figures (for 2015-2016) show further significant 
levels of decline.23 The number of employees who were trade union members was around 
6.2 million in 2016, 275 thousand less than in 2015 (a 4.2 % decrease). Given growth in the 
total number of people in employment, the proportion of employees who are trade union 
members fell to 23.5 per cent in 2016, compared to 24.7 per cent in 2015. The overall 
proportion of private sector employees who are trade union members declined to 13.4 per 
cent from 13.9 per cent in 2015. The proportion of public sector employees who are trade 
union members decreased to 52.7 per cent in 2016 from 54.9 per cent in 2015. Just over a 
quarter (26.3 %) of workers are covered by collectively bargained pay agreements in the UK 
with the figure being 59 per cent for those in the public sector, and 14.9 per cent for the 
private sector. Membership and collective bargaining coverage is greater for those in direct, 
permanent employment compared to those in contingent employment forms.  
                                           
16  Eurostat 2017a: Employment and Unemployment Labour Force Survey Data: Tables, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/main-tables; Eurostat (2017b) Taking a Look at the Self-employed in 
the EU, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170906-1. 
17  Ibid.: 4.  
18  Forde and Slater 2014: 20.   
19  Eurostat 2015: 5. 
20  Eurostat 2017b: 1. 
21  ONS 2017.  
22  See for example, Klair 2016: 1. 
23  Department of Business Innovation and Skills 2017: 5.  
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1.2. The platform economy 
1.2.1. Legal context 
In UK employment law, there is a key distinction between worker, employee and self-
employed status, and these definitions determine which employment rights workers are 
entitled to (see also discussion in Chapter 4). Debates over these categories have come to 
the fore during recent court and tribunal cases involving individuals, or groups, of platform 
and “gig” economy workers.  
Workers in the UK are entitled to certain employment rights, including getting the National 
Minimum Wage; paid holiday, rest breaks, working time limits; protection against 
discrimination; entitlement to be treated no less favourably if they work part-time. However, 
they are not typically entitled to minimum notice periods before dismissal. They also do not 
typically receive statutory redundancy pay or the right to request flexible working.24  
All employees are workers, but an employee has extra employment rights and responsibilities 
that do not apply to workers. These rights include Statutory Sick Pay; 
statutory maternity, paternity, adoption and shared parental leave and pay; minimum notice 
periods if their employment will be ending, for example if an employer is dismissing them; 
protection against unfair dismissal; the right to request flexible working; time off for 
emergencies; and Statutory Redundancy Pay. Some of these rights require a minimum length 
of continuous employment before an employee qualifies for them.25  
A person is self-employed if they run their business for themselves and take responsibility 
for its success or failure. Self-employed workers do not typically have the employment rights 
of employees or workers. In the case of workers in the platform economy, there has been 
widespread debate over the extent to which workers are being wrongly classified and 
categorised as self-employed by agents, intermediaries and platform providers (see 
discussion of selected cases, Chapter 4).  
Platform work has triggered considerable media interest in the UK. After an initial burst of 
enthusiasm about the (supposedly) egalitarian potential of the platform economy, media 
coverage has increasingly focussed on low pay, poor working conditions, questionable 
contractual arrangements, perceived employer abuses, and lack of social protections. As a 
result, public and political discourse has increasingly situated the gig economy alongside 
other forms of precarious labour, such as zero-hours contracts (in retail and many other 
sectors), umbrella companies (especially in supply teaching and construction), and the use 
of agency staff under draconian conditions (for instance, at Sports Direct, and Amazon).  
Media coverage of collective organisation and unrest among workers on platforms such as 
Deliveroo has explicitly linked the platform economy with the growth of precarious work – 
and union activity – in other sectors. Indeed, issues around the platform economy and 
precarious work have seen unions taking a relatively high profile stance; both established 
unions such as Unite and GMB, as well as newer, small and militant unions such as the 
Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB) and United Voices of the World (UVW). 
Perhaps most significant from a policy perspective, three recent court cases have underlined 
common features between the gig economy and other forms of precarious work: employment 
tribunals have found that people working for Uber, CitySprint, and Pimlico Plumbers were not 
self-employed, contrary to the claims of these companies, and rather, they should be treated 
as workers.26   
                                           
24  Gov.uk 2017: 1.  
25  Ibid.: 2. 
26  Taylor Wessing 2017: 1.  
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Growing concern over employment practices in the platform economy has led to signs of 
moderation in the UK government's established non-regulatory approach. In particular, 
official recognition of concern led in November 2016 to the Conservative government setting 
up the Taylor Review of Employment Practices in the Modern Economy, which has considered 
the implications of new forms of work, driven by digital platforms, for employee rights and 
responsibilities, employer freedoms and obligations and the existing regulatory framework 
surrounding employment.27This review has included in its work both definitions of employee 
status and access to social protections. At the same time, two parliamentary select 
committees have conducted investigations into related areas. The Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy Select Committee has conducted an enquiry into the "Future world of 
work and rights of workers",28 with considerable discussion of ways of clarifying or, indeed, 
challenging the (mis)categorisation of workers in new forms of precarious work, including 
online platforms and the gig economy. At the same time, the Work and Pensions Committee 
investigated self-employment and the gig economy, with a particular focus upon how the 
benefits system might be tailored to fit growing numbers of "self-employed".29 Thus, there 
are significant indications that official debate over social protections for workers in the 
platform economy in the UK is shifting to reflect the scale of public concern over employment 
practices in this growing sector of employment.  
1.2.2. Development of the platform economy 
As of December 2016, some 92 per cent of UK adults (aged 16-74) use the internet every 
day or nearly every day, and 78 per cent have used the internet to buy goods or services for 
personal use in the last three months.30 Not surprisingly, then, online economic activity has 
seen considerable growth in the UK in recent years, including the platform economy. 
Nevertheless, precise data on the scale of participation in this type of work remains elusive. 
In 2014, NESTA31 estimated that 64 per cent of the UK population had participated in the 
"collaborative economy" – defined very broadly to include buying and selling goods over the 
internet, but not including paid work. In 2015, using the same broad definition, NESTA32 
estimated that around one third of the UK population had sold personal items in the 
"collaborative economy" via the internet.  
Looking specifically at paid work carried out via the mediation of online platforms, there is 
growing evidence that a small but significant proportion of the workforce participates in this 
type of employment in the UK. An online survey carried out in January 2016 found that 5 per 
cent of the sample carried out paid work via an online platform at least once a week, with a 
further 4 per cent having done so at some time in the past.33 Using a somewhat larger 
sample, a further online survey carried out in December 2016 found that 4 per cent of 
participants had engaged in this type of work at least once in the previous twelve months.34 
Both these surveys also found that for a substantial minority, work via an online platform 
provided their main source of income. Thus, while there remains a need for large scale, offline 
research to establish definitively the scale of platform-mediated work in the UK, what 
                                           
27  BEIS 2016. 
28  BEISC 2017. The UK general election of June 2017 formally dissolved parliament and therefore terminated this 
Select Committee enquiry; however, a considerable amount of evidence had already been taken, both written 
and oral, which has been made available.  
29  WPC 2017. 
30  Eurostat 2016a: 3. 
31  NESTA 2014: 22. 
32  Ibid.: 5. 
33  Huws, et al. 2016: 28. 
34  CIPD 2017b: 4.  
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research has been carried out so far demonstrates its presence as a non-trivial and 
apparently growing sector of employment in the UK.  
Despite difficulties estimating the size of the platform economy, economic activity in this area 
has become sufficiently commonplace that a number of platforms, such as Airbnb and Uber, 
are now household names in the UK. Among the work platforms (as opposed to rental or 
sales sites), the best known include Uber, Deliveroo, Upwork, Freelancer, RatedPeople and 
TaskRabbit. There is also evidence that platform providers are now starting to move into 
areas of employment that have previously been precarised as a result of outsourcing and 
privatisation of former public services; for example, SuperCarers.com to provide domiciliary 
social care using an online platform model. What is more, alongside details for potential 
customers about how to access and pay for their services, the websites of these companies 
all carry information for anyone who wants to engage in paid work to provide those services.  
As for workers in the gig economy, research suggests that they tend to be young, to have 
another job, to be relatively evenly balanced in terms of gender, and to be relatively highly 
educated (though less so than US studies suggest). The work they do is varied, low-paid, 
unreliable, and often intermittent.35 
 
 
                                           
35  CIPD 2017a: 6; Huws, et al. 2016: 28-39.  
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 12 PE 614.184 
 FRANCE 
France is an important country in which to study the development of the platform economy. 
Platform working has grown rapidly, particularly through the intersections with the leisure 
and tourism industry. Airbnb, for example, considers France to be one of its important 
markets, and there are a large number of smaller French start-ups focused on leisure, tourism 
and homemade food and drink. Much of the platform economy in France is undertaken by 
people who hold down other kinds of work as well, as a means of supplementing their 
income rather than a sole source of revenue. This, however, is by no means universal and 
there are important exceptions, most importantly Uber. Uber’s French operations have 
sought to engage drivers who are from relatively less affluent backgrounds and who tend to 
become more reliant on the company for work. The relationship between the company and 
these drivers has been fractious and the subject of sometimes fierce confrontation.  
France is also an important country because of the challenges the platform economy poses 
to the established employment relations system. Much of French social protection legislation 
is designed with a standard permanent employment relationship in mind. As such, there are 
some important weaknesses in the way social institutions protect platform economy workers, 
and some notable deficiencies in their levels of protection when compared to salaried 
workers. There have been attempts to create statuses such as that of auto-entrepreneur, 
along with efforts at stimulating cooperative institutions for the self-employed, though these 
initiatives have encountered some teething problems. France’s comparably State-centric 
employment relations context may also play an important role in shaping the collaborative 
economy in future. Government, for instance, intervened directly to make recommendations 
to progress the dispute between Uber and its drivers.  
2.1. Labour market trends 
France has an unemployment rate of 10.1 per cent, higher than the EU28 average (8.6 
%), and sixth-highest within the EU.36 According to Eurostat,37 France is one of only five EU 
countries where the unemployment rate did not decline from March 2016 to March 2017, and 
unemployment has remained persistently high at over 10 per cent since 2013.  
Table A 3: Employment and Unemployment rates in France, 2016 
 Employment Rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) 
France 70.0 10.1 
EU 71.1 8.6 
Source: Eurostat (2017a)38. 
As of 2016, France’s employment rate was 70 per cent39. Fifty-six per cent of France’s 
unemployment was short-term, as of 2015.40 This puts it fifteenth in the EU28 in terms of 
rates of long-term unemployment. However, youth unemployment is a particular problem in 
France, with 24.6 per cent of the youth labour force being unemployed as of 2016, compared 
to the EU28 average of 18.7 per cent. 
Contingent and flexibilised forms of work have been increasing in France (Table A4 presents 
figures for 2016), partly encouraged by government efforts to liberalise the labour market. 
                                           
36  Eurostat 2017c: 1. 
37  Ibid.: 1. 
38  Eurostat 2017a: Employment and Unemployment Labour Force Survey Data: Tables, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/main-tables. 
39  Ibid.: 2.  
40  Ibid.: 3.  
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Temporary employment in France has been growing since the turn of the millennium, at a 
rate which is slightly faster than the EU average, and is now at around 14 per cent. These 
trends in France, alongside other major European economies such as Germany and Italy, 
account for much of the wider growth in temporary work across the EU as a whole. Part-time 
employment is well established in France with nearly one in five workers employed on this 
basis in 2016. In addition, trends in temporary work may be seen as evidence of growing 
segmentation in the French labour market, as temporary workers are likely to be clustered 
in lower-paying firms (rather than temporary contracts being primarily used as part of a mix 
within firms).41 According to the World Bank and Eurostat figures42 the self-employment 
rate in France as of 2016 was between 11-12 per cent, having risen slightly after the 2008 
crisis.  
Table A 4: Part-time, temporary and self-employment in France, 2016 
 Part-time 
employment (%) 
Temporary 
employment (%) 
Self-employment (%)  
France 18.3 14.3 11 
EU 19.5 12.0 14 
Source: Eurostat (2017a); Eurostat (2017c)43. 
France has a highly distinctive employment relations system, notable principally for the large 
gap between union density rates and collective bargaining coverage. While union 
membership is extremely low by European standards (at around 7%, having declined 
significantly over the past thirty years), collective bargaining coverage is as high as 98 per 
cent.44 This gap partly reflects the important role of the State in French employment 
relations: the government mandates company-level negotiations over pay, working time and 
other issues though companies are not obliged to reach agreements and can impose terms 
and conditions unilaterally if they see fit. Company-level bargaining has been encouraged in 
recent years, and there have been measures implemented to allow these agreements to 
deviate from industry level conditions. In addition, government extends collective bargaining 
coverage by mandating the extension of particular company-level agreements across 
industries when it deems it appropriate.45  
In terms of social protection, France is typically considered a conservative welfare 
state, with status-preserving benefits being maintained by a contributions-based system. In 
response to concerns around youth unemployment, new non-contributions-based 
mechanisms were introduced, primarily RMI/RSA, although workers under-25 are usually 
(though not always) excluded from this. Healthcare follows a social health insurance model, 
though the coverage of basic schemes has been declining and people are being encouraged 
to fund their own additional coverage through private or mutual insurers.  
2.2. The platform economy 
2.2.1. Legal context 
The growth of the platform economy in France has been contested and has raised important 
legal questions. These are particularly visible in relation to the expansion of larger 
                                           
41  Ibid.: 1. 
42  World Bank 2016: 1. 
43  Eurostat 2017a: Employment and Unemployment Labour Force Survey Data: Tables, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/main-tables; Eurostat 2017b Taking a Look at the Self-employed in 
the EU, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170906-1. 
44  Worker Participation.eu 2016: 2.  
45  Ibid.: 2. 
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multinational firms, notably Uber and Airbnb, the two biggest platform economy enterprises 
operating in France. These companies have adopted contrasting strategies in relation 
to French legislation. Uber has been confrontational in dealing with French regulators, 
having fallen afoul of legal rulings (particularly with its UberPOP service) and having been 
the subject of major protest organised by taxi driver unions who see it as evading key 
regulations. Airbnb has an easier relationship with French authorities, though the established 
hospitality industry has been lobbying strongly against it on the grounds that it escapes 
regulations they must follow and hence constitutes unfair competition.  
One of the most important questions raised by the platform economy in France is the issue 
of worker status. French employment relations have, as noted, been strongly based around 
the category of the salaried worker, and the traditional distinction between worker and 
entrepreneur. The growth of the platform economy has thus been associated with the need 
to create new statuses, though the situation in this respect remains contested and 
ambiguous. Generally, new statuses have sought to create more categorisations within the 
broad concept of the entrepreneur, rather than forming an intermediary stage between 
entrepreneur and salaried worker.  
One of the most important developments is the creation of auto-entrepreneur status. This 
refers to individuals working on their own as individual entrepreneurs rather than salaried 
staff, or as employers in their own right. When individuals set up a business in France, they 
can choose whether or not to select this status, and they do so in about 45 per cent of cases 
(Interview, Expert). An auto-entrepreneur must earn less than 33k euros per year. Auto-
entrepreneur status enables people to deviate from the main tax regime for businesses and 
is intended to simplify book-keeping responsibilities.46 However, it also introduces more 
flexibility in terms of social insurance contributions. People with low revenue can opt-
out of social insurance contributions.47 Note that current debates in France are seeking to 
draw further distinctions in this respect. The Social Security Financing Bill 2017 aims to 
distinguish between platform economy activity that is about earning extra income (e.g. 
Airbnb) versus cost-sharing to recoup expenses (e.g. BlaBlaCar, which enables people to 
carpool). The former would then be liable for social insurance contributions while the latter 
would not.48 The growth of the platform economy has also been reflected in the development 
of another new status, that of entrepreneur-etudiant, which is intended to provide a 
framework for students conducting entrepreneurial activity to support their studies or to 
increase their employability (Interview, Academic expert). 
These kinds of developments have done little to assuage debates around the issue of 
employment status in the platform economy, and the way the ambiguities in this respect 
affect France’s largely contributions-based welfare system. According to a Cour de Cassation 
ruling in 1996, for someone to be classed as an employee there needs to be a lien de 
subordination: “executing work under the authority of an employer who is able to give orders 
and directives, to control the execution and to sanction shortcomings”. So (in theory), to 
avoid being an employer under French law: workers must be free to accept or not accept a 
service; the platform mustn’t give them instructions: the platform must avoid sanctioning or 
exercising control over them: the worker must have freedom to choose how to execute the 
service (without any set procedures or evaluations etc.): and they should determine their 
own hours and their own hourly tariff. The worker must also not be using the platform’s tools.  
Despite this framework, until very recently there were no cases where platform economy 
workers had been reclassified as salaried employees at the behest of French courts, 
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though there is the important ongoing dispute between Uber and URSSAF (see below). In 
January 2017, however, a cab driver working for the French start-up and Uber competitor 
LeCab won the right to be classified as an employee because the company imposed an 
exclusivity clause on him (other issues such as directing his hours and their capacity to 
impose sanctions on him were not seen as deciding factors). It is too early to say what the 
wider effects of this might be. La Tribune49 estimates that the fact the judge’s decision was 
based solely on the exclusivity issue (tightened up by the Loi Grandguillaume in 2016), means 
the ruling will be relatively insignificant for many platform economy enterprises. Nonetheless, 
while there appears to be limited movement in practice, some advocates for “auto-
entrepreneurs” see this prospect as a “sword of Damocles” hanging over the sector in France 
(Interview, Expert).  
Note that France differs from two of the other countries in this study - Germany and 
Spain - in that it has not introduced a new “independent worker” status as a midpoint 
between independent contractor and salaried worker: this is because they are worried that 
companies would use this not to reclassify independent contractors, but to downgrade the 
status of those who are currently employed.50 Pascale Terrasse’s51 proposals are emblematic 
of current French thinking in calling for a personal and portable social account for individuals, 
i.e. social insurance accounts which are attached to individuals rather than jobs and carried 
around from project to project. This, he hopes, would help platform economy workers in a 
context where they can struggle to gain access to social rights such as housing and 
unemployment insurance, without necessitating a change in employment status.  
Another important development concerning worker status is the concept of portage 
salariale. This idea refers to the creation of cooperative institutions known as CAEs, which 
act as third-party non-profit employers for those with auto-entrepreneur status. In this way, 
the latter are converted into salaried staff through their participation in a mutualist 
organisation, enhancing their access to employment rights and social protection. 
Nonetheless, according to one interviewee (Interview, Government advisory body) these 
sorts of measures tend to be more applied to older workers moving into partial retirement. 
Its limited applicability within the platform economy may reflect the fact that participation in 
these kinds of organisations requires auto-entrepreneurs to be employed by the CAE on the 
basis of a permanent contract (Interviews, Worker representatives). There are restrictions 
derived from EU law which prevent these kinds of associative organisations from negotiating 
with platforms, though some may be able to do this in a more informal and amicable way.  
There is also concern in France around the way in which platforms are able to avoid making 
social contributions, as well as requirements around licensing and taxation, by positioning 
themselves as intermediaries rather than employers. Nonetheless, reports which draw 
attention to this (e.g. Terrasse report) are often more concerned with the perspective of 
consumers than workers - for instance, platform economy food enterprises may get around 
rules concerning hygiene. There is a growing interest in finding ways to distinguish between 
those who enter the platform economy merely as a pastime and those who do it “habitually”, 
to whom more regulations should be applied (an issue also raised in the Terrasse report). 
There are also concerns around the extensiveness of the régime social des indépendants 
(RSI), the social insurance fund for auto-entrepreneurs. In France, all paid activity, however 
it is organised and whether it is in addition to a regular income elsewhere or not, obliges 
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participants to affiliate to a social security regime. Unlike in many other countries, RSI 
provides platform workers with relatively extensive social insurance mechanisms.52 
Accessing RSI benefits is also problematic for the self-employed, owing not so much to the 
absence of a coherent system but to low pay and, as a result, low contributions.53 There is 
also the problem that companies like Uber have tried to avoid paying into RSI through hiding 
the amount of work that is done. This is the subject of an ongoing legal dispute with URSSAF, 
the non-profit organisation charged with collecting contributions to French social insurance 
systems. Expert interviews for this study highlight various specific problems in the coverage 
of RSI, which make it ill-adapted to coping with the vagaries of working life in the platform 
economy. It provides only weak protection for short-term absence from work through illness, 
or life insurance. It also tends to provide weaker coverage in terms of additional health 
insurance (to cover gaps in public provision). As one interviewee noted (Interview, 
academic), aspects such as unemployment coverage, and work-related ill-health coverage 
are voluntary rather than obligatory for auto-entrepreneurs, and the self-employed are also 
less likely to have purchased additional health insurance coverage. RSI also suffers from 
management problems, such as delays in payment processing, which can disincentivise its 
supposed beneficiaries.  
2.2.2. Development of the platform economy  
France is one of the leading sites in the development of the platform economy in Europe, 
with the sector being much more developed than in neighbouring countries such as Germany 
or Spain. Aside from well-established multinationals, such as Uber, France produces many 
of its own platform economy enterprises; 70 per cent of French platform economy 
enterprises are domestic startups. The most dynamic and competitive sector is travel, with 
the biggest French collaborative economy enterprise being BlaBlaCar, which enables people 
to save or recoup transport costs through carpooling, and which has now expanded from 
France into various other European countries. The second biggest sector is accommodation; 
France having a very large tourism industry which makes it very attractive to Airbnb and 
comparable enterprises. Another major area of platform economy growth in France is in food, 
with leading examples including Vizeat and La ruche qui dit oui. However, in this area, the 
market is less competitive than in transport, with a more oligopolistic structure. Areas such 
as odd-jobs and services are also important with various French start-ups (e.g. YoupiJob, 
SuperMano) but appear to be a very underdeveloped and fragmented market by 
comparison.54  
Barbezieux and Herody55 distinguish between “micro-entrepreneurs”, i.e. people who do 
many very small tasks for very small fees (e.g. Mechanical Turkers), and particuliers (i.e. 
private individuals) who participate in the platform economy as an “active hobby” (loisir 
actif). The latter, they say, are vastly more common in France than the former, who are 
comparatively rare. Uber is distinctive here, because in France 71 per cent of its “partners” 
are dependent on it for the majority of their income. This differentiates it both from other 
platforms in France, as well as Uber’s own operations in other countries such as the USA 
(where this figure is only 20%). 
French authorities have sought to develop the platform economy through various 
entrepreneur-development programmes aimed at young people such as ESSEC-Venture, or 
local public initiatives which try to bring entrepreneurs together with funders (such as 
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fundme.fr in Brittany and STAR WEST in the Loire). Bigger companies such as BlaBlaCar, 
however, have been accelerated by major multinational financial investment. French policy 
discourse is usually very keen to disassociate the term “collaborative economy” (which they 
like and want to encourage) from “Uberisation” (which is usually a pejorative term), hence 
this focus on encouraging domestic start-ups.  
The precarity of platform economy work is often underplayed by the use of the term 
“active leisure” to describe the activities of those working. Some academic observers 
interviewed for this study argue that many, particularly young people, are driven to become 
“slashers” (an Anglicism used to indicate people who work simultaneously as auto-
entrepreneurs and employees; one of the interviewees for this project put 2 million French 
people in this category) by stagnant pay and less reliable careers as employees (see typology 
in Chapter 5).  
A key challenge in France relates to representation. Co-operative organisations (as with 
the CAEs mentioned above) are important in France, and provide an important means 
of accessing protection and rights for many workers. There may, however, be two reasons 
why these kinds of organisations have limited applicability within the platform economy. For 
one thing, these kinds of organisations tend to be very small and specialised, prioritising the 
quality of support over numbers represented, which make them ill-adapted to deal with large 
platforms. For another, French law imposes certain restrictions on such organisations, 
requiring that their “employees” be engaged on permanent contracts. This poses a barrier 
for some organisations, such as the Belgian cooperative SMart.be which has sought to extend 
its operations in France.56 While it can act as a mutualised employer for some French workers 
on an exclusively fixed-term basis, this is limited to certain sectors such as the arts. 
Generally, it would have to engage people as permanent staff.  
There are other ways in which platform economy workers are likely to struggle to attain 
representation. Some have expressed concern that people’s rights to collective 
representation are being undermined, as is the quality of social dialogue.57Workers and 
unions have big knowledge gaps around the regulatory and legal framework for platform 
economy work, and there is no collective interlocutor who could bring together platform 
economy enterprises and government in dialogue (such as Sharing Economy UK in the UK). 
Platform economy workers have the right to organise collectively in France, but this does not 
happen much in practice because of geographical dispersal and the isolation and anonymity 
of the labour process. There is no physical space for socialisation among platform economy 
workers. There have been organisations like FEDAE (Federation of auto-entrepreneurs), but 
these do not have any collective bargaining functions. Various unions have sought to unionise 
platform economy workers but their models have proved ill-adapted to do this.  
To improve collective voice, some have suggested new platforms for evaluating 
platforms where data are provided by worker themselves.58 They also want to create 
an exception travail to EU competition law, giving independent worker reps the right to 
negotiate with platforms over things like commission rates without falling afoul of European 
law. This runs counter to the Kunsten ruling in the ECJ which found that a collective contract 
stipulating minimum fees for independent service providers is against EU law unless they can 
be shown to be false independents. They see the examples of FairCrowdWork in Germany 
(IG Metall) and Turkopticon as examples of platforms that France should try to emulate.  
Discrimination is another likely problem. One observer (interview, Academic expert) noted 
that the growth of the platform economy alleviates problems of discrimination in some 
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respects but exacerbates them in others. Workers from discriminated-against groups may 
find employment in the platform economy where they are discriminated against elsewhere. 
However, customer-led means of evaluating service provision is a highly non-transparent 
tool (the customer has little requirement to justify a low rating for an Uber driver, for 
instance), meaning there is little transparency or means of recourse against customer-
initiated discrimination.  
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 ITALY 
The platform economy in Italy has grown rapidly in recent years, against a backdrop of 
expanding low-paid, temporary and precarious jobs, and a slow recovery from the economic 
recession of 2000-2011.59 However, the platform economy per se remains relatively under-
developed when compared to some of the case study countries in this report such as the UK 
or France. Social protection of workers employed via platform working have been the focus 
of much debate and interest. Some innovations in social protection for self-employed workers 
in the platform economy are visible. Italy has also seen important labour market reforms 
under the Renzi government (2014-2016), namely the “Jobs Act”, and most recently a new 
law, the Statute of Self-Employment (lavoro autonomo), has been issued, which will have 
important implications for the social protection of workers in the platform economy. 
Amidst rising unemployment, growing numbers of Italian workers have turned to the platform 
economy for a second source of income. Recent changes to labour law have meant that some 
temporary and self-employed workers have seen levels of protection in the labour market 
increase, although the extent to which the Jobs Act covers many in the platform economy is 
an open question, and there remain concerns about the implications of the rise of on-
demand working for workers. For example, Foodora (a company which has sought to 
provide restaurants with a new source of customers, using “riders” to deliver food), has been 
the subject of recent labour protests over their terms and conditions of work. An interview 
with a former worker of Foodora for this study revealed the key challenges in terms of 
representation and social protections of these low-end sections of the platform economy. 
3.1. Labour market trends 
According to Eurostat figures (see Table A5), the employment rate in 2016 in Italy was 61.6 
per cent, below the EU average, and at a level which has only just returned to the rate in 
2009. The increase in employment rate for women has been sluggish. The unemployment 
rate has gone down from 11.9 per cent in 2015 to 11.7 per cent in 2016, although this figure 
remains high compared to the EU average. Despite a decline in the inactivity rate among the 
Italian population between 2015 and 2016, Italy remains the EU country with the highest 
percentage of population aged between 15 and 64 outside of the labour market (35.1 per 
cent compared to an EU average of 27.1 per cent).60  
Table A 5: Employment and Unemployment rates in Italy, 2016 
 Employment Rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) 
Italy 61.6 11.7 
EU 71.1 8.6 
Source: Eurostat (2017a)61. 
In terms of youth employment and unemployment, 2016 saw an increase in the number 
of employed workers age 15-34 years, but this rise was very modest (+0.9% growth 
compared to 2015). Higher increases in employment rates have been seen amongst those 
aged 50 and above (+4.8% in 2016), which may reflect stricter criteria to access pensions.62 
Another useful indicator, especially for the state of the youth workforce, and also of critical 
importance for understanding the rise in platform working, is the rate of over-qualification 
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recorded among the Italian active population. One-quarter of the workforce is working 
below their skills and qualification level. These figures are greater for young workers (38.2 
per cent), and foreign born workers (37.4 per cent).  
It is worth noting that the majority of employment growth across EU Member States is 
concentrated in the service sector, and these broad trends are mirrored in the Italian 
case. Nearly two-thirds (65%) of the active population is employed in the service sector.63 
Overall in Italy 95 per cent of the increase in the number of employed individuals between 
2015-16 has been in services, notably in transport and warehousing (logistics) and hotels 
and restaurants. A pattern of polarisation amongst professional occupations can be seen, 
with the growth of unskilled jobs alongside, at the opposite end of the spectrum, a rise in 
employment in highly qualified and technical professions.64  
In terms of contractual and employment characteristics (see Table A6 below), 10.9 per cent 
of the directly employed workforce in Italy are on fixed term contracts, compared to the 
EU average of 12 per cent. Permanent employment had seen a massive contraction in Italy 
since 2008, although it has begun to rise again since 2015. There has also been a marked 
rise in “autonomi” or self-employed workers, with self-employment accounting for one in 
five jobs in Italy.65 The growth of self-employment has been almost exclusively concentrated 
among those sectors of the economy that do not have dependent workers.  This factor shows 
the growing relevance of individual self-employed and more broadly “hybrid areas of work” 
that are being considered “impossible to classify in terms of the classic dichotomy between 
salaried employment and self-employment” in the Italian context66 (as well as in other EU 
countries).  
Table A 6: Part-time, temporary and self-employment in Italy, 2016 
 Part-time 
employment (%) 
Temporary 
employment (%) 
Self-employment (%)  
Italy 18.5 10.9 21 
EU 19.5 12.0 14 
Source: Eurostat (2017a); Eurostat (2017b)67.  
As a result of the Job Act labour market reform, on paper the growth of atypical employment 
is slowing down. Fixed term contract forms such as “collaborative” and project-based 
employment contracts (“co.co.co” employment) have diminished since 2008. But there 
has also been a growth in the number of directly employed workers with fixed term 
contracts of less than 12 months’ duration.  Overall almost six out of ten “atypical 
workers” have a contract of inferior duration than 12 months in Italy, and 17 per cent 
have a one year fixed term contract. Among younger workers, one in four are still engaged 
either in a fixed term contract or a collaboration contract (almost one in three women).  
The “permanency” of non-permanent jobs is also decreasing: according to the data from the 
IV quarterly, after 12 months the “permanency rate” of this kind of job decreases. For young 
workers on fixed-term contracts there is a higher probability of either entering into a standard 
employment relation but also falling back into unemployment.68The only form of employment 
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that has continuously grown since the crisis years has been part- time employment (called 
“partially standard employment”): overall 4.3 million individuals were in part-time work in 
2016 (an increase of 29.3 per cent since 2008).  
The persistence of a steady unemployment rate and precarious labour market conditions 
must be understood in terms of the liberalisation of employment relations and weaker 
trade unions. Since it was codified in the Worker Statute Employment Law in 1970 the 
Italian system of industrial relations has been based on a workplace-based type of union 
representation, with relatively solid legal rights but not covered by a clear organisational 
definition.69 A peak level agreement of 1993 established a clearer structure of workplace 
representation called RSU (Rappresentanza Sindacale Unitaria di base or “grassroot union 
representation”) a collective body representing all workers in a productive unit, 
independently from their particular union membership. In essence the RSU workplace 
representation is union-based, with representatives enjoying significant legal powers, and 
comprises all union confederations present in that workplace. The main three union 
confederations (CGIL, CISL, and UIL, reflecting various political persuasions) cover the 
majority of union membership, although a variety of other autonomous and smaller trade 
unions exist and are growing in influence and popularity among the workforce in recent years. 
The three major confederations play a role in negotiating key legislation before it gets passed 
by the Parliamentary chambers, according to a principle of “flexible statutory regulations” 
and a model of “peak level tripartite bargaining”.70  
Italy has a collective bargaining coverage of about 80 per cent and a relatively high 
level of trade union density of 35 per cent, compared to many other EU countries.71 
National collective bargaining is still the primary form of employee voice. Italy is a country 
with a predominance of statutory collective bargaining although recent years have witnessed 
patterns of decentralisation of collective bargaining. National bargaining agreements are still 
predominant.72 Despite this traditional pattern in Italian industrial relations it is worth noting 
that so-called “collective form of secondary bargaining” including workplace, enterprise, 
territorial or even individual bargaining, are spreading. Secondary bargaining is present in 
15 per cent of firms whilst “integrative bargaining” (where the national level coexists with 
these other levels of bargaining even in the same enterprise) can be found in 29 per cent of 
firms.73  
With regard to the representation of workers in the platform economy, there are no formal 
unions of freelancers or self-employed workers. New forms of self-organisations such 
as the workers’ cooperative and service providers ACTA and Smart Italia74 have emerged as 
alternative forms of representation in traditionally self-employed labour sectors such as the 
performative arts and creative industry. Platform workers have been organising 
autonomously at least in the Foodora case, with some help from grass roots organisations.  
3.2. The platform economy 
3.2.1. Legal context 
When it comes to the legal regulation of the labour market in Italy the relatively recent Labour 
Reform introduced under the Renzi government - the Jobs Act - represents without doubt 
one of the most critical reforms in the history of Italian employment relations and labour 
                                           
69  Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 23. 
70  Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 23. 
71  ETUI 2015: 1. See also Fulton 2015: 10.  
72  ISTAT 2017. 
73  Ibid. 
74  See footnote on p.110.  
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 22 PE 614.184 
market regulation; although previous critical milestones include the Biagi Law and the 
Pacchetto Treu which first introduced forms of de-regulation of contractual arrangements, 
and dismissal rules by employers. 
The Jobs Act, technically called Law 183, was issued in 2014 and has been recognised as 
marking a critical change in the country’s system of employment relations. The key change 
has involved the completion of a process of reform started in the 1990s by the introduction 
of a new contract called “contratto a tutele crescenti”, which literally means a “contract with 
(gradually) increasing protections”. This reduces the responsibility on the employers’ 
side towards workers in cases of unfair dismissal. Indeed, the euphemism of “gradually 
increasing protections” hides the de-regulative substance of the reform that de facto removes 
any obligation for employers to reinstate workers in cases of invalid dismissal. This replaces 
the old, open-ended contract of employment, making the use of the new “open-ended 
contract” more convenient than a fixed-term one for employers in terms of lighter 
contribution and stronger fiscal advantages, it takes away the possibility of referral to the 
courts in case of unfair dismissals. In other words, with the final abolition of the protection 
from unfair dismissal, historically protected under Article 8 of the Statute of Worker (already 
substantially diminished by the Fornero Reform), workers can now be arbitrarily fired without 
firms having to provide any economic rationale. Also, in the case of invalid dismissal, instead 
of reinstatement firms are now only required to provide some reimbursement to workers, 
based on the length of their employment tenure.75  In other words, the expression “tutele 
crescenti” (gradually growing protections) is misleading, because it does not refer to worker 
protection per se but to the ways of calculating competition for unfair dismissal: the amount 
of indemnity is indeed proportional to the seniority of the worker, which is the length of 
“service” at the point of dismissal.76 The key aspect of this new contract type is that even 
though it is called “permanent” it, de facto, deprives workers of the benefits of a traditional 
open-ended contract. The Act also makes it easier for employers to engage temporary 
workers. Recent analysis of the effects of the Jobs Act on the Italian labour market77 has 
demonstrated that there has been no substantial increase in employment; temporary jobs 
have increased more than the open-ended ones; and part-time employment has also risen. 
As the authors explain:  
“the use of temporary contracts is facilitated by the elimination of previous restrictions 
on their adoption - before the Jobs Act implementation, firms were allowed up to a 
maximum of 20% temporary over the total amount of contracts. The crucial change 
regards the new open-ended contract, the ‘contratto a tutele crescenti’ [CTC], 
designed to become the prevalent contract in the Italian labour market. The latter, in 
fact, is only nominally permanent since it allows for extremely cheap layoffs depriving 
workers of the reinstatement right. Moreover, just before the introduction of the new 
contract, a substantial monetary incentive - lasting three years and taking the form 
of a reduction in firms’ social contributions burden per employee - has been provided 
to firms hiring under a [CTC] permanent contract or transforming other contracts into 
[CTC] permanent ones”.78  
Perhaps a counter-trend has been represented by a recent labour law reform: the “Statuto 
del lavoro autonomo” or self-employment statute. In May 2017, the Parliament chambers 
passed a new law (“Provvedimento legislativo organico sul lavoro autonomo professionale”) 
regulating professional self-employment in Italy. As highlighted by Acta (one of the 
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organisations of freelancers interviewed for this research), this is the first time that 
autonomous workers and freelancers have been recognised as workers, thus establishing 
some new rights and protections for this category. The positive measures are mainly in the 
field of welfare rights (improved maternity and parental rights; sickness coverage also for 
tumours) as well as fiscal benefits when it come to new rights to reimbursement and/or 
deductions from taxation in relation to travel and other maintenance expenses, and for 
covering for work equipment, as well as rights to lifelong learning and training. 
The most important change introduced by the new Self-Employment Statute is cultural, with 
Article 1 defining the recipients of the new policy: for the first time this comprehensive 
regulation covers the whole of the autonomous professional world of work, notably 
those outside the professional bodies (ordini) or guilds. This represents a step away 
from a binary approach to self-employment as originally regulated under the “Gestione 
separata dell INPS” (the "Special fund for self-employed workers") first introduced in 1995. 
This had created a neat distinction between fully independent professionals and other self-
employed workers. The latter had been grouped under the “para-subordinati” label, and were 
forced to pay much higher contributions with the aim of discouraging individuals from taking 
part in this special INSP fund. In this regard, the association of freelancers ACTA argues that 
the new statute represents a step forward from the disadvantaged position of this category 
of economically dependent self-employed work.  
These types of self-employment still differ in terms of the amount of social protections 
that they receive. Indeed, one of the criticisms developed towards the new statute of self-
employment was that it was a “missed opportunity” (for a true reform). Sinistra Italiana, a 
new political party, has highlighted the limitations of the scope of the new law. On the one 
hand, there are more protections for those without a subordinate relationship with a client 
or the obligation to provide the service (lavoro autonomo), like designers, freelancers in the 
creative industry, education and other professionals. On the other hand, other categories 
(like the “parasubordinati” with special INPS fund), remain uncovered by these protections 
(beside some elements linked to maternity) as well as all workers from the “platform 
economy” and mini jobs (“lavoretti”), who also remain unprotected under the new 
law. 
3.2.2. Development of the platform economy 
In terms of the rise and growth of the platform economy, broad trends are not easy to track 
in the Italian context, but available data suggests that it is relatively under-developed 
compared to other EU countries. An interview with an Italian journalist, specialising in the 
platform economy revealed that while the high-profile case of Foodora (the food delivery 
company organising riders through an app similarly to Deliveroo) has been an exceptional 
one, and the development of the low-end platform work is still in its infancy, they do 
anticipate growth over the next decade. The challenges emerging from the platform economy 
in terms of social protection for workers need to be contextualised against the background 
of wider regulatory (or de-regulatory) patterns of the Italian labour market, namely the de-
structuring of the standard employment relationship (“relazione di lavoro eterodiretta” e 
“lavoro subordinato”), that is direct or “dependent employment” as opposed to the growth of 
indirect or self-employment (autonomous employment according to the Italian terminology). 
The Italian case is also one where there is a clear distinction made between the 
sharing and collaborative economy on the one hand and the “gig” economy on the 
other. The economic sectors where there is actually a sharing of goods and services are 
mainly in transportation and personal services. They need to be distinguished from the “on 
demand economy” of Foodora or Uber. The latter only use the technology to organise work, 
there is nothing collaborative about it apart from the use of the App, but the bottom line is 
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the exploitation of casualised labour. Yet the sharing economy properly understood is only 
marginally developed in Italy.79 
One of the first mappings of sharing platforms highlights their prominence in carpooling, 
ridesharing, Car Sharing peer to peer, and parcel delivery. Childcare and dog sitter 
services and time banks also exist.80 There are few real examples of sharing work, and these 
have tended to be found in the tourism sector of some regions of Italy. Anecdotal evidence, 
cited by respondents in this study, refer to few very short term attempts of start-ups in large 
Italian cities like Milan and Turin (where the lifespan of these new, platform firms is quite 
short, between 3 weeks and 3 months), while in the Centre and South of Italy some examples 
of investment of sharing economy type start-ups in the ecological/sustainable tourism sectors 
have started to emerge. These can be interpreted as alternative non-monopoly types of 
“Airbnb”, but are typically linked with the attempt to valorise the resource of a locality.81  
Within this relatively small-scale sharing economy, it is also important to note that these 
very new forms of entrepreneurism may actually emerge out of the same social and 
employment insecurity, indebtedness and under-employment conditions that 
underpin the Italian economy. An illustration of this point is that the sharing economy 
tends to be small scale and dependent on limited personal savings and funds, rather than 
venture capital.  
In terms of the market patterns of the sharing economy one of the interviewees for this study 
made the point that after the year of the crisis 2007-8, new smaller platforms emerged in 
certain sectors previously dominated by monopoly providers. BlaBlaCar initially impeded the 
emergence of other platforms, while these are now emerging and finding their niche market 
(Icarry is specialising in transporting items and parcel rather than people; auting is about car 
sharing peer to peer). Finally, in terms of the business model of the platform economy in the 
Italian case an interesting parallel can be drawn with the world of co-operatives, which has 
been traditionally strong in the Italian context.  
Yet, despite the relatively modest presence of the platform economy per se, the debate in 
Italy is relatively advanced when it comes to social protections, and demand for alternative 
forms of social assistance and security by the variety of social movements in civil society. A 
“Charter of Rights” was advanced by the CGIL and it is recognised by social movement actors 
as a step forward in terms of the official unions finally recognising that there are precarious 
forms of self-employment that need social security. However, unions remain attached to 
advocating contributory insurance types of social security. In this sense, there is a “stubborn-
ness” even amongst the most enlightened unions such as the CGIL, that, while 
acknowledging the need to embrace technological developments and the new opportunities 
that this might bring to workers, young and old, to understand the need for alternative forms 
of protections such as universal basic income or to consider alternatives to the usual 
contributory type of social protections. Traditional representative institutions of worker 
representation do not understand the ontological shift in the nature of the workforce, and 
rather remain attached to a “labourist model” of permanent employment that does not exist 
anymore, at least in Italy. 
                                           
79  For an overview of the sharing economy, proper, in Italy, see: Pais and Mainieri 2015.  
80  Ciccarelli 2016.  
81  From one interview conducted for this study, we found that the same city Matera is also the site of an experiment 
in the sharing economy “Casa Netural in Matera” where coworking and social innovation combine to regenerate 
an area of the local territory (alternative hospitality and tourism using the Gnammo platform). 
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 GERMANY 
The impact of the platform economy on Germany is the subject of much interest and debate. 
High proportions of Germans have connectivity82 and basic internet skills.83 Yet, there are 
acute skills shortages in the area of ICT, suggesting that Germany is not fully prepared for 
the effects of digitalisation and the rise of the platform economy.84 The potential impact of 
digitalisation and platform working is keenly debated. According to a study by the Federal 
Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS), 12 per cent of jobs in Germany have a high 
probability of displacement due to automation, while 42 per cent of employees in Germany 
might be affected (in terms of the activities they undertake in their jobs by automation).85 
However, the same study concludes that overall, digitalisation may have a positive effect on 
jobs.86 Other studies highlight the potential for the positive co-existence of new 
sharing and more traditional models of the economy, and even predict a positive 
outcome of the sharing economy for the establishment of new businesses.87 
In Germany, the platform economy is relatively well established, with the most widely used 
platforms for cloudworking or crowdworking being Upwork, Freelancer and Clickworker. 
Clickworker is the biggest German platform with 700, 000 members. Among on-line platforms 
the most well-known are Airbnb, Mytaxi, Helpling, Bookatiger, and MyHammer. All of these, 
in one way or another, serve individuals and their needs for individual transportation, and 
household services.  
4.1. Labour market trends 
The employment rate in Germany is 78.6 per cent, and the unemployment rate is at its lowest 
level since before 2005, well below the EU average. The German economy recovered more 
rapidly than many EU Member States after the recession, and job growth since 2011 has 
been strong. 
Table A 7: Employment and Unemployment rates in Germany, 2016 
 Employment Rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) 
Germany 78.6 4.1 
EU 71.1 8.6 
Source: Eurostat 2017a88. 
However, out of the 44 million people in employment only 75 per cent pay social insurance 
contributions. This is largely explained by the structure of the labour market.  
As Table A8 below reveals, one quarter of workers are in part-time employment, 12 per cent 
in temporary employment and 9 per cent in self-employment.89 Many part-time, temporary 
and self-employment jobs are not subject to social insurance contributions.  
  
                                           
82  Akamai 2016. 
83  Buhr et al. 2016. 
84  BA 2015. 
85  BMAS 2015a, 2015b. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Institute of German Economy 2016. 
88  Eurostat 2017a: Employment and Unemployment Labour Force Survey Data: Tables, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/main-tables. 
89  Federal Statistics Office: Yearbook 2016. 
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Table A 8: Part-time, temporary and self-employment in Germany, 2016 
 Part-time 
employment (%) 
Temporary 
employment (%) 
Self-employment (%)  
Germany 26.7 11.9 9 
EU 19.5 12.0 14 
Source: Eurostat (2017a); Eurostat (2017b)90  
The share of permanent employment has decreased heavily from 70 per cent of the workforce 
in 1985 to 46 per cent of the workforce in 2015. Part-time work has increased from 13 per 
cent in 1990, up to 22.4 per cent in 2015 which is much higher than the average in the 
European Union. The share of involuntary part-time employment rose to over one in five of 
those working part-time during the recession, but has fallen to one in six in 2015.91  
Looking in more detail at temporary employment, the majority of these workers (8.4% of 
the employed workforce in total) are on fixed-term contracts with a single employer (others 
are on contracts with temporary work agencies, or on seasonal or casual contracts). Half of 
those working on fixed term contracts would like a permanent job. The total share of agency 
work in employment is 2.5 per cent, concentrated amongst younger workers and those in 
elementary occupations.92 Self-employment has also increased in Germany with 9 per cent 
of the workforce in this form of work.  Nearly six per cent (5.9%) of the workforce are solo-
self-employed.93 Self-employed workers in Germany have higher educational qualifications 
on average than the workforce as a whole.94  
In terms of employment security, protection against dismissals is high in Germany, 
compared to the EU as a whole. Union density has declined in recent years, with only 17.7 
per cent of workers now members of a union, compared to 31.1 per cent in 1990 at the time 
of reunification. Collective bargaining coverage remains high, though, at 65 per cent in West 
Germany and at 51 per cent in East Germany. In 2015, 41 per cent of employees in 
companies with more than 5 workers in West Germany were working in a company with a 
works council, compared to 36 per cent in East Germany.95 
4.2. The platform economy 
4.2.1. Legal context  
A key debate in Germany has centred on whether platform workers are “solo-self-
employed”, “bogus” self-employed, or employees, and this mirrors a broader 
debate and discussion over these terms in the economy as a whole. Traditionally in 
Germany self-employed workers were highly qualified professionals like lawyers, accountants 
or medical doctors with a relatively secure income. Digitalisation and the rise of the platform 
economy has led to increases in solo-self-employment in other business areas. In these 
areas, self-employment tends to generate rather small, insecure, and often unsustainable 
incomes. These self-employed workers often operate without any business assets. Self-
employed workers in Germany are increasingly churning through jobs, with their 
                                           
90  Eurostat 2017a: Employment and Unemployment Labour Force Survey Data: Tables, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/main-tables; Eurostat (2017b) Taking a Look at the Self-employed in 
the EU, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170906-1. 
91  Eurostat 2017a; Eurostat 2017b; OECD 2016; Federal Statistics Office: Statistical Yearbook 2016. 
92  Eurostat 2015. 
93  Ibid. 
94  Expert interview. 
95  Federal Statistics Office 2017. 
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work resembling wage labour. It has been argued that solo self-employment is 
substituting for dependent employment.96 
There has been a long debate about bogus self-employment in Germany and many attempts 
to curtail it through revisions of the Code of Social Law. The most recent and radical attempt 
to restrict bogus self-employment can be seen in German Civil Code 611a, a law which has 
come into effect on 1 April 2017, and which distinguishes the employment contract from a 
service contract.  
Section 611 defines the object of a service contract as a “promised service for an agreed 
remuneration”. The new section defines an employment contract as an obligation to provide 
a service for somebody else in personal dependence, being subject to the orders of 
the customer of the service. The orders can dictate the content, the processing, the timing 
and the location of the service/activity. In other words, a person who cannot plan their work 
and their working time is an employee. Autonomy has become the crucial distinction 
between wage labour and self-employment.  The aim of the law is to prevent bogus self-
employment. Bogus self-employed workers could now claim for their right to be an employee 
instead of self-employed.   
Germany also identifies “employee-like persons” in law. These are persons who are self-
employed but who are economically dependent on one client. With respect to social security, 
employee-like persons are considered to be self-employed persons. However, by way of 
exception, specific provision is made to include these individuals in the state pension scheme 
and the statutory accident insurance scheme.97Those employee-like persons often are 
freelancers who are economically dependent and usually work exclusively for one client, or 
that more than 50 per cent (30 per cent in the media sector) of their income is paid by one 
client.98 However under current German rules, platform workers are not considered 
employees or employee-like persons, they are classified as self-employed persons. 
In this case, platform workers have significantly less social protection than employees or 
employee-like persons.99  
In the German context, there are other laws that might become relevant for the regulation 
of the platform economy, laws that could be applied by way of analogy to platform workers. 
Consumer protection law deals with the general terms and conditions of platforms.100 Such 
provisions are laid down in sections 305 to 310 of the Civil Code. Klebe and Heuschmid,101 in 
agreement with Däubler,102 believe that many of the terms and conditions are contrary to 
German consumer protection law and that legal provisions could be used to challenge some 
of the wrongful terms and conditions of platforms. 
The Homeworking Act (Heimarbeitsgesetz) offers another potential route for extending 
protection to platform workers. As a general rule, the provisions of labour law do not apply 
to homeworkers. However, there are some important exemptions and homeworkers could be 
entitled to some of the protection specified in the Works Constitution Act, Statutory Sick Pay 
Act (Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz), Parental Leave Act (Elternzeitgesetz), Paid Leave Act 
(Urlaubsgesetz), Safety and Health at Work Act (Arbeitsschutzgesetz) and the Dismissal 
Protection Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz). Moreover, section 17 of the Homeworking Act 
makes special provision for collective bargaining. For the purposes of social security, 
                                           
96  Brenke and Beznoska 2016. 
97  Klebe and Heuschmid 2017. 
98  Vogel and Dribbusch 2009. 
99  Klebe and Heuschmid 2017. 
100  Ibid. 
101  Klebe and Heuschmid 2017.  
102  Däubler 2015. 
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homeworkers in Germany are generally protected (through section 12(2) of the Fourth Book 
of the Social Security Code (Sozialgesetzbuch IV)).103  
Finally, collective bargaining law may provide some means of protecting platform economy 
workers, although currently this is rare. In principle, antitrust law (Kartellrecht) 
prohibits self-employed workers without employees - as well as companies - from 
seeking arrangements on prices. German legislation specifically authorises trade unions 
to bargain for employee-like persons (section 12a of the Collective Agreements Act 
(Tarifvertragsgesetz)).  
4.2.2. Development of the platform economy  
The size of the platform economy in Germany remains rather small. There is no clear 
data available, so only estimations are possible, from ad hoc surveys. These surveys all come 
to a similar conclusion, that platform work is only a marginal phenomenon in Germany at the 
moment, involving up to 3 per cent of the workforce.104 A survey conducted in 2016 among 
platform workers suggests the following characteristics: a crowdworker in Germany is active 
on average on two platforms, for on average 15 months (8 months in case of microtask 
platforms), 50 per cent have higher education, and the majority are single.105 As is the case 
in many of the case study countries looked at in our study, most people appear to use 
platform work as an auxiliary/add-on income. However, out of those working on platforms, 
one third do not have health insurance, and nearly half (47 per cent) do not pay into a 
pension scheme.   
The rather limited size of the platform economy might be explained by the ambivalence of 
businesses towards crowdwork. A representative survey among 1,500 companies in Germany 
conducted by BITKOM, the business association in the ICT sector, reveals that only 26 per 
cent of managers were aware of crowdsourcing.106 A representative survey conducted by 
BITKOM in 2017 among 503 companies with more than 20 employees reveals that 62 per 
cent of the top managers had never heard of platforms or the platform economy before. Only 
14 per cent of those who have heard about platforms actually own a platform themselves.107 
So, Germany seems to be some way behind other countries in generating revenues out of 
platforms.  
However, although the phenomenon seems rather small in size at the moment, there are a 
number of activities occurring at the policy level. The Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs set up a special group for the platform economy, and commissioned a representative 
survey of 20,000 individuals who will be asked about their activities in the platform economy. 
On that basis, they will then decide whether to include it into longitudinal studies of SOEP108 
or Microzensus,109 key surveys in Germany. Until then, the Ministry takes the view that since 
most platform workers are undertaking this work as a second job, they receive protection 
through a primary job. 
However, the Ministry have also launched a wide ranging public consultation on the future of 
work. In 2015, The Ministry published a Green Paper with questions about the extent to which 
                                           
103  See Klebe and Heuschmid 2017. 
104  See for example Huws et al. 2016. 
105  Leinemeister et al. 2016. 
106  Bitkom 2016. 
107  Bitkom 2017. 
108  SOEP 2017. The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of 
private households, located at the German Institute for Economic Research, DIW Berlin. See 
https://www.diw.de/en/soep. 
109  Mikrosensus 2017. Mikrozensus is a representative study of private households, carried out by the Federal 
Statistics Office. See https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html.  
The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy 
 
PE 614.184 29  
digital transformation is positively or negatively affecting work and setting out important 
areas for action and key social issues concerning the world of work. This consultation and 
engagement has resulted in the publication of a White Paper, called Work 4.0. Through 
it, the Ministry want to capture and define the broader public debate and provide impetus. 
Ideas for further policy reforms include:   
• the right for continuing training and education, an increase in training for employees 
and a substitution of unemployment insurance toward an employment insurance that 
would allow to bolster employability of workers; 
• the right for part time work. Employees should have the legal right to choose their 
working time suitable to their life circumstances; 
• to strengthen the rights of works councils to increase codetermination rights for digital 
work; 
• to include the self-employed into the statutory pension scheme;  
• to enlarge the Home Work Act to crowd workers; 
• for social protection, they propose a personal employment account which fits each 
young person with a capital stock that could be used for qualification, sabbaticals, or 
as a subsidy for a start-up. Employees might have the chance to put money into that 
account as well so that it becomes sustainable over the life course.110  
While business associations are relatively positive about the new possibilities platform work 
enables, trade unions are concerned about the degradation of working conditions.111 As a 
first step to counter this, they have opened up themselves to self-employed workers. Ver.di 
organises 30,000 self-employed workers already, whilst IG Metall has given equal access to 
self-employed workers with effect from 1 April 2017. The IG Metall FairCrowdWork Watch 
project also offers counselling for platform workers, research on the topic, and policy making. 
In 2017, the first Code of Conduct for platform working was published in Germany. It goes 
back to an initiative of the German crowdsourcing platform Testbird. Seven other big 
platforms have signed the Code already, among them Clickworker, Crowdguru, Streetspotr, 
Appjob, 24insights, Bugfinders and Content.de. They commit themselves to legal compliance, 
transparency and fair payment, as well as supplying training and eLearning for service 
providers.112  
The German case provides a number of starting points for extending social protection. The 
problem of insufficient protection of self-employed is not a new phenomenon but 
the question has gained increased public attention since the introduction of 
platform work. In particular unions are worried that the platform economy may lead to 
more outsourcing, replacing rather well secured standard employment with less secure self-
employment. A number of options have been discussed in the German case. First, the 
collective bargaining options for employee-like persons (section 12a of the Collective 
Agreements Act) could be extended to platform workers. This would allow them to 
negotiate collectively for fair pay and working conditions. This approach is seen by unions as 
a first priority, since it will enable the self-employed to participate in social security systems 
like health care and pension. 
Secondly, there have been attempts to improve access to existing social security 
systems for self-employed workers, by changing the structure of contributions and making 
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provision compulsory (especially for old age pension). For health care the minimum income 
threshold could be dissolved so that no minimum contribution is expected. Rather, members 
would pay a certain percentage of their actual income. Furthermore, taking into consideration 
the increased number of shifts between employment, self-employment and unemployment, 
there are more fundamental ideas debated to replace the current social security with a 
system that is more encompassing and which provides greater security over the life course. 
Thirdly, unions favour a defined minimum wage for platform workers, oriented to the 
minimum wage for wage labour. As a potential avenue for this they consider the 
Homeworking Act being promising which would allow employer associations and trade 
unions to define activity and skill profiles and define an appropriate price/pay for it.  
Basic income is not considered to be a good option of social protection as it would lower the 
level of protection and contribute to the increase of low paid precarious jobs.113 Unions see 
basic income as a neoliberal redistribution mechanism that disadvantages those who are 
really in need of support; the unions favour, instead, minimum wages.114  
Legislation might also be amended to increase social protection for platform workers.  First, 
at a national level, co-determination rights could be extended. At the moment, works 
councils do not have information rights about zero-hour contract workers, individual 
subcontractors, or Crowdworkers in their companies. Information provision as well as co-
determination rights should be extended to include these new types of service providers and 
workers.  Furthermore, trade unions need access to the contact details of these people to be 
able to inform them about their activities and to recruit them as members. Beyond this, 
unions request regulation by competition as the huge concentration of platforms leads to 
monopoly power. In particular, in cases where bogus self-employment is in place, unions 
strive for transforming service contracts into employment contracts, as in cases like 
Deliveroo, or as happened with Bookatiger. 
Last but not least, platforms themselves need to be take responsibility for their actions. This 
requires greater control of platforms and if necessary, sanctions, if labour law is violated. 
Minimum commercial standards, clearly defined in the general terms and conditions, should 
be applied to platforms operating in Germany. Platforms should also be held accountable for 
being employers not only mediators, paying into the social security systems, via taxes or into 
security funds. The experience with the German Artists' Social Welfare Fund 
(Künstlersozialkasse) shows a potential pathway for this to happen. The Artists' Social 
Welfare Fund is a social security fund for artists and freelancers in the media. It consists of 
contributions from artists themselves, but they pay lower contributions than alternative 
private or public funds would claim. Clients or customers have to pay in a certain percentage 
of the price of the artefact or the honorarium for the service into the social security fund. 
Platforms should also be forced to become more transparent in terms of how they operate, 
in terms of their algorithms and in terms of the rates paid for services.  
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 SPAIN  
Spain has been severely affected by the economic crisis since 2008. This has resulted in high 
rates of unemployment and the labour market continues to be one of the most serious 
structural problems faced by the country. Although GDP and macroeconomic measures have 
begun to improve since 2014, this recovery has not been paralleled by improvements in the 
labour market statistics. During the crisis, Spain experienced one of the largest falls of 
employment in the European Union. Unemployment remains high at 18 per cent.115 Spain is 
somewhat distinctive in the EU in terms of its large shadow economy which makes up a 
significant proportion of GDP and also the labour market and this shadow economy expanded 
alongside rising unemployment.  
In parallel to the economic crisis, the political scene remains similarly unstable, with 
Spaniards having voted in two inconclusive elections over the past two years. The traditional 
social democratic party, PSOE, has lost a lot of support to the new left party, Podemos, and 
the incumbent minority conservative party has struggled to form a government. In addition, 
strong secessionist movements are raising the spectre of secession in regional areas; the 
disputed independence referendum in Catalunya, held in October 2017, being perhaps the 
clearest example. Platform economy working is still in its infancy in Spain, and much of it 
remains hidden at present.  
5.1. Labour market trends 
Significant labour reforms took place in Spain in 2010 and 2012. These have included: 
measures to give greater priority to firm-level collective bargaining; to adopt internal 
flexibility; to reduce payments for unfair dismissal and dismissal of permanent workers; and 
to discourage the consecutive use of temporary contracts.  
Table A 9: Employment and Unemployment rates in Spain, 2016 
 Employment Rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) 
Spain 63.9 19.6 
EU 71.1 8.6 
Source: Eurostat 2017a116. 
Following the labour reforms, there appears to have been somewhat of a recovery in terms 
of employment and unemployment over the past few years. Despite this, the correlation 
between these two phenomena remains contested.117 Both employment and long term 
unemployment in Spain are currently at higher rates than OECD averages.118 As Table A9 
shows, the employment rate in Spain stands at 63.9 per cent, the lowest since 2002 and one 
of the lowest in Europe.119 Unemployment hit its highest in 2013 at nearly 27 per cent, before 
beginning to fall, although it still has not regained its pre-crisis rate of 11.8 per cent.120 In 
2016, the rate of unemployment was 19.6 per cent, one of the highest in the EU.  
                                           
115  Ministro de Empleo y Seguridad Social 2017. 
116  Eurostat 2017a: Employment and Unemployment Labour Force Survey Data: Tables, available at: 
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The labour reforms have had the effect of “wage moderation”,121 which has impacted on 
workers’ living standards. Real wages in the country have dropped since 2008, although have 
begun to climb again in the past few years. The government’s Index of Labour Prices 
published by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) demonstrates a fall in the cost of labour 
between 2008 and 2014, by 0.7 per cent. In terms of a wage floor, the Spanish minimum 
wage, which is applicable to all employees, regardless of contractual status, is 707.60 EUR 
per month or EUR 23.59 a day. More than 5 million people in Spain who are in 
employment currently work at the minimum wage.  
The labour market situation in Spain has improved over the past two years. GDP 
growth picked up in 2014 and growth stood at 2.3 per cent in 2015 which resulted in 
significant job creation. Despite this improvement, a number of weaknesses remain. 
Employment recovery has lagged behind any GDP recovery in Spain. Spain’s economy grew 
by 1.4 per cent in 2014 and is predicted to recover to the pre-crisis level only in 2019. 
Meanwhile, employment is not predicted to recover to pre-crisis levels until 2027.122 
Additionally, in terms of youth employment, 12.9 per cent of young people in Spain are not 
in employment, education or training. Structural reforms following the crisis have been 
interpreted by some authors as having worsened labour market access for the most 
vulnerable and specifically for young people.123 As of 2015 only 18.7 per cent of 15-24 year 
olds were in employment.124 This has led some commentators to argue that Spain has 
experienced the greatest damage in labour market access out of all of the EU 
Member States, with Spain scoring second to last in the “Labour Market Access” dimension 
of the Social Justice Index 2015.125 There is also a large proportion of the labour force in 
Spain with less secure employment.126  
The shadow economy makes up a significant proportion of Spain’s labour market, accounting 
for almost a quarter of GDP. This proportion has been rising through the economic crisis and 
is twice the size of other EU countries such as France or the UK.127  
Table A 10: Part-time, temporary and self-employment in Spain, 2016 
 Part-time 
employment (%) 
Temporary 
employment (%) 
Self-employment (%)  
Spain 16.1 21.8 16 
EU 19.5 12.0 14 
Source: Eurostat 2017a; Eurostat 2017b128  
Temporary employment has always made up a large proportion of the Spanish labour 
market, as, the rate of temporary employment in Spain has been almost three times the 
European average for over two decades.129 As Table A10 shows, one fifth of all employment 
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is temporary and has developed to this degree as a result of a flexibilisation strategy 
introduced in the 1980s to reduce unemployment.130 
Self-employment is gaining prominence in the Spanish labour market and currently makes 
up 16 per cent of the labour force. Self-employment appears to be largely characterised by 
single workers with no employees. Approximately two-thirds of self-employed workers report 
that they would rather be full time employees and large numbers suggest that they became 
self-employed “out of necessity” suggesting a lack of viable alternatives in the labour 
market.131 Part-time employment is well established in Spain, but has increased since the 
global recession of 2010-12, perhaps reflecting more limited job opportunities and a rise in 
under-employment. Key issues cited by the self-employed appear to be high administrative 
charges, high tax rates and the black economy. The federation of Self-Employed Workers of 
Spain (ATA) has requested a cut in administrative charges and taxes for the self-employed.  
Trade unions are recognised in Spain under the 1978 Constitution, following the end of the 
military junta under Franco. Trade union density in Spain is reasonably stable and currently 
stands at 16.9 per cent. Following the labour market reforms of 2010 and 2012, collective 
bargaining coverage fell from 59 per cent in 2008 to 41 per cent in 2013.132 
Trade union elections can take place only in workplaces with six or more employees. This 
limitation means that the vast majority (78.7 per cent) of companies in Spain cannot hold 
union elections.133 Larger companies which can have such elections employ the majority of 
workers, however, meaning that 86.6 per cent can potentially be represented by a union. 
The two largest unions are General Workers’ Union (UGT) and the Confederation of Workers’ 
Commissions (CCOO), who represent the vast proportion of workers. 
Union activists and workers participating in strikes are facing increasing criminalisation and 
many have been prosecuted for strike related activities. Historically, since the end of the rule 
of Franco, incidents in labour disputes “have generally been dealt with as minor offences or 
misdemeanours”.134 Since 2010, however, there has been an increasing use of parts of the 
penal code which allows for long prison sentences for workers participating in labour disputes. 
There is little evidence of the existing unions engaging with workers in the collaborative 
economy and they instead have argued for more formal contracts in the gig economy to 
reflect traditional employment relations. 
5.2. The platform economy 
5.2.1. Legal context  
Reforms to the labour market since the economic recession have had a significant impact on 
the Spanish labour market, and, through their impact on those who are self-employed or in 
atypical work, have impacted on those in platform work. The 2012 Law on Urgent 
Measures for Reforming the Labour Market (Law 3/2012) intensified labour market 
segmentation by creating more space for fixed term, agency and marginal part-
time work.135 The reforms promoted greater flexibility in the labour market, which has 
resulted in a larger number of the Spanish workforce falling outside the main sources of social 
protection – the General Scheme of Social Security. However, as Rodriguez Cabrero et al. 
(2017) point out, the Self-Employed Work Statute of 2007, and the 2013 reform of social 
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protection for part-time workers regarding pensions, have “increased convergence between 
the Special Scheme for Self-Employed Workers (RETA) and the General Scheme of Social 
Security and improved the social protection of the self-employed”.136  
This is not to suggest that the self-employed receive equal levels of social protection to 
directly employed workers. As Rodriguez Cabrero et al. (2017) point out, income instability 
and low average income for the self-employed lead to differences in social 
protection in practice, with self-employed workers often missing out on unemployment 
insurance protection and pension coverage.137 They argue that insurance contribution bases 
need to be more realistic, set at a lower level, in line with the real income of self-employed 
workers. Furthermore, they argue that since the vast majority of self-employed workers 
choose the minimum contribution base (in order to pay lower contributions), any change to 
the system requires an agreement or pact between unions, government and business 
organisations.138 
5.2.2. Development of the platform economy 
The platform economy in Spain is still relatively underdeveloped. Indeed, much of the 
platform economy still exists as part of the hidden or shadow economy in Spain.139 There is 
a significant shadow economy in Spain, and alongside this, there is some speculation that 
workers may not wish to engage with platforms, as they would make them visible and formal. 
For example, migrants offering delivery services outside places such as Ikea exist in parallel 
to the platform economy. A new Comisión nacional de los mercados y la 
competencía, or CNMC (National Commission for Markets and Competition) has been recently 
established, which is a merger of different regulatory bodies in Spain. Both Barcelona and 
Madrid are attempting to position themselves as good places for tech start-ups and there are 
a large number of “accelerators” – Wayra; Startupbootcamp; Seedrocket; Conector. In 
addition, Barcelona recently hosted “OuiShare fest”, a sharing economy festival, meaning 
that platforms are fairly well networked in the city.  
There have been three major legal cases brought against different platforms by various social 
groups, including Uber, BlaBlaCar, Cabify and Airbnb. Uber was banned in Spain in December 
2014. The Madrid Taxi Association has protested against Uber, and Barcelona’s main taxi 
service has complained that Uber does not have to abide by existing regulations, which bring 
costs such as licensing. The case went to the CJEU, which ruled that Uber's activities did not 
abide by existing laws and represented unfair competition.140 In March 2016, Uber returned 
to business in Spain, with its UberX service, which used only professional licensed drivers, 
and which targeted only the private hire sector in Madrid (only 10% of taxis in the capital 
city).141  
Confebus, the association of bus drivers, took BlaBlaCar to court citing unfair competition 
and the decline in the use of bus services. With Cabify, it was the Federación Madrileña del 
Taxi which presented an official complaint in front of a judge. Both Cabify and BlaBlaCar have 
been enabled to continue operating until a more formal decision is made. Finally, Airbnb have 
been fined €30,000 in Barcelona for breaking tourist laws. The platform company has 
responded by commissioning and publishing data which claims that Airbnb puts 175 million 
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euros into Barcelona’s economy and that 75 per cent of people renting out their flats through 
the service have incomes below the national average.  
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 BULGARIA 
Bulgaria is a country with a highly qualified young workforce and has become a key 
destination for outsourcing in the IT sector in the EU. Given the Bulgarian labour market and 
average pay levels it is unsurprising to find that that Bulgarians participate very actively in 
the platform economy and that platforms are growing rapidly, albeit from a relatively low 
base. They have been most active in the area of Upwork. Unionisation is low, almost zero in 
the ICT sector, and due to Socialist legacies interest in labour representation is very low. 
Bulgaria is thus an environment where platform economy working is likely to rise very 
quickly, even though robust data on the phenomenon remains hard to find.  
6.1. Labour market trends 
The employment rate in Bulgaria was 67.7 per cent in 2016 (Table A11), a 2 per cent 
increase on the previous year.  In a sign of an improving labour market, the unemployment 
rate in 2016 was 7.6 per cent, a figure that was 1 per cent lower than 12 months 
previously.142 Just over half (54%) of all those unemployed had been unemployed for more 
than 6 months, with long-term unemployment higher for men than women. The 
unemployment rate for young workers (under 30) in 2017 was 11 per cent, a figure that is 
falling and which is lower than in many EU countries.143  
Table A 11: Employment and Unemployment rates in Bulgaria, 2016 
 Employment Rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) 
Bulgaria 67.7 7.6 
EU 71.1 8.6 
Source: Eurostat (2017a)144. 
Table A 12: Part-time, temporary and self-employment in Bulgaria, 2016 
 Part-time 
employment (%) 
Temporary 
employment (%) 
Self-employment (%)  
Bulgaria 12.0 3.6 11 
EU 19.5 12.0 14 
Source: Eurostat (2017a); Eurostat (2017b)145  
In the first quarter of 2017, 64 per cent of all those in employment worked in the service 
sector. The ICT sector in Bulgaria has developed particularly rapidly over recent years, with 
2.5 per cent of all jobs being as ICT specialists. Bulgaria has the highest proportion of female 
ICT specialists of any EU country (28 per cent).146   
As Table A12 shows, 11 per cent of the workforce are in self-employment, a figure that 
has risen over the last decade, particularly strongly in the ICT sector. Part-time work is 
relatively low compared to many other European countries, although it has risen over recent 
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years. Temporary employment has also risen, although the current figure of 3.6 per cent 
is still relatively low in comparison to other EU countries.   
6.2. The platform economy  
6.2.1. Legal context 
The Labour Code regulates labour relations between employee and employer, industrial 
relations, collective bargaining and control of labour regulations compliance. Recent changes 
to the Labour code have sought to make the labour market more flexible, in particular to 
introduce more flexible working hours. A separate internship contract was also introduced in 
2014. One-day employment contracts were also introduced in 2015, for use in the 
agriculture sector in jobs that require no special training of employees and workers. These 
contracts can only last for 90 days in any calendar year.147   
Employee representation and collective bargaining are also regulated in the Labour Code. 
Overall control over labour legislation compliance in all economic sectors is provided by 
the General Labour Inspectorate, part of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy.148 Industrial 
relations in Bulgaria has become more decentralised since the 1990s, although the National 
Council for Tripartite Cooperation (NCTC) was established in 1993, and includes members of 
all representative trade unions and employers’ organisations, as well as the representatives 
of the government. As Eurofound note, since 2011 social dialogue and industrial relations in 
Bulgaria have been functioning in a complex political and economic climate, in a context in 
which the state has sought to disregard tripartism.149 Trade union density is 18 per cent in 
Bulgaria, and collective bargaining coverage (through company agreements) is 29 per 
cent.150  
Many platform economy workers in Bulgaria are considered to be self-employed or 
entrepreneurs. As Zahariev151 points out, social and health insurance legislation in Bulgaria 
uses the term “self-insured” to refer to all persons who pay their own contributions and do 
not have an employer: this would include most self-employed. All self-employed persons 
have to pay the insurance due based on a minimum insurable amount each month. If they 
earn more, the difference, up to that due on the maximum insurable income, is paid at the 
end of the tax year. Most problematically in terms of social protection, as Zahariev notes,152 
self-employed workers have no protection against unemployment, and little 
protection in the event of a workplace accident. 
In some other areas, self-employed workers enjoy similar levels of social protection to other 
workers. Zahariev notes that retirement rules are also the same as for regular employees, 
and the size of state pension is calculated using the same formula. However, self-employed 
workers are not organised strongly into trade unions. Zahariev also points out that the 
Bulgarian social security and the health insurance systems face large deficits each year, and 
that there is a trend to reducing access for citizens, rather than looking to extend protection 
to new groups.153  
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6.2.2. Development of the platform economy 
Platform work has grown relatively rapidly in recent years. The sectors in which the presence 
of collaborative economy in Bulgaria is strongest are transport, ICT and tourism, although 
robust evidence on the extent of platform economy working in these sectors is limited. With 
regard to the ICT sector, the main occupations are programmers, system administrators, 
specialists in software maintenance, specialists in testing software, specialists creating 
websites, graphic design, copywriting, marketing, email marketing specialist, specialist in 
optimising search engines, etc. (outsourcing and reassigned services and activities, the so-
called call centres employees). In the transport sector, drivers are the main occupational 
group, whilst in tourism, the main categories are renting out real estate property, and 
services at home (construction, maintenance, cleaning, etc.) 
The basic forms of employment for workers in the platform economy are self-
employment and entrepreneurship. However, interviewees for this study found it hard to 
define how work in the platform economy differs from “traditional”, standard forms of 
employment. The main reasons pointed out for this difficulty was that different types 
of sectors were included in the platform economy, and that labour legislation 
defining the various types had yet be developed. In answer to the question, 
interviewees united around the view that, since people working in the collaborative economy 
had no single employer and no concrete work place, no information could be obtained 
concerning the working conditions, working hours, quality of jobs, or types of activities 
performed. 
There is as of yet no organised social protection of workers in the platform economy in 
Bulgaria. The various professions differ and the problems arising are specific; all this makes 
it difficult for the respective workers to be covered under a single legal protection. Such a 
legal framework has yet to be defined in the various sectors. A considerable number of people 
must be employed in the platform economy before the process of social protection can really 
start, and respective policies be introduced. The genuine economic and social need for legal 
regulation and a legal framework might then appear. According to the respondents, such 
regulations should be considered at the national level and the general European level.  
The great challenge to trade union representatives, employers’ organisations, and ministries 
is reaching those workers that perform platform work, and establishing who they are, as 
these forms of work are still largely hidden in the grey economy. Social protection is seen a 
two-sided process, with every protection involving rights and obligations.  
Overall, in Bulgaria, there is a positive attitude towards the development of the collaborative 
economy. The collaborative economy leads to growing competition, the possibility of ensuring 
timely, higher-quality services at more reasonable, lower prices, the possibility of having 
access to different people fulfilling the same kind of activity or service, including people who 
are not necessarily on the national labour market. Generally, the respondents suggested that 
the ways to make people aware of the need for social protection (so they can make a 
genuinely informed choice) are: a widespread media initiative aimed at clarifying the basic 
proposals of the trade union associations, and formal education and informal education 
concerning the issue.  
The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy 
 
PE 614.184 39  
 POLAND 
The Polish economy has seen significant labour market reform over the last 15 years. At the 
present time, unemployment is historically low, and employment high, although these figures 
mask large regional differences, and high levels of long-term unemployment, particularly 
amongst younger workers. Non-standard employment, particularly temporary work is high, 
and civil law contracts (subject to lower social security contributions from employers) are 
rising. The platform economy is growing in Poland, although it remains still relatively 
underdeveloped compared to a number of the other countries in the EU.  
7.1. Labour market trends 
The Polish Labour Force survey reveals a rise in employment and a decline in unemployment 
over recent years. In 2016, the employment rate in Poland stood at the 69.3 per cent, 
representing a small rise since 2015. The unemployment rate was 6.2 per cent, a fall of 1 
per cent from the previous year.154 Unemployment is lower than the EU average of 8.7 per 
cent. A recent EURES report indicates that the unemployment rate in 2016 was the lowest 
level that it has been at any point over the last 25 years.155  
Table A 13: Employment and Unemployment rates in Poland, 2016 
 Employment Rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) 
Poland 69.3 6.2 
EU 71.1 8.6 
Source: Eurostat (2017a)156. 
This relatively positive picture is tempered by stark regional differences, with unemployment 
being high in areas such as the Mazowieckie Region, and within this the Szydłowiecki District, 
where the unemployment rate exceeded 30 per cent in April 2016. The seasonal nature of 
Polish employment has also been recognised as a structural issue. Over half of the 
unemployed have not completed secondary education, one in four has no work experience, 
and nearly 40 per cent have been registered as jobless for over a year. The average duration 
of unemployment remains high.157 While the fall in unemployment rates in part reflects a 
greater availability of jobs in a more buoyant labour market, it also reflects rises in inactivity 
rates, and rises in the number of the unemployed participating in activation schemes.158 
As Table A14 shows, atypical work accounts for a significant proportion of the workforce in 
Poland. Temporary employment accounts for more than one-in-five of the workforce. 
Indeed, most job creation in Poland over recent years has occurred almost entirely through 
temporary employment contracts.159 Part-time employment is below the EU average, 
standing at 7 per cent in 2014.160 Maciejewska and Mrozowicki argue that this is due to low 
median wages, which make it difficult for workers to sustain themselves on contracts with 
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low hours. Temporary agency work increased fourfold between 2004-2014, standing at 
around 700,000 in 2014.161  
Table A 14: Part-time, temporary and self-employment in Poland, 2016 
 Part-time 
employment (%) 
Temporary 
employment (%) 
Self-employment (%)  
Poland 6.4 21.9 18 
EU 19.5 12.0 14 
Source: Eurostat 2017a; Eurostat 2017b162. 
Freelance contracts and other unnamed “civil law contracts” are some of the most often used 
forms of flexible employment in Poland. Civil-law contracts are not subject to Labour Code 
regulations and thus require lower or no social security contributions, and account for a large 
share of temporary contracts. The latest data available from the Central Statistical Office 
suggests that 1.3 million people (8.2% of the employed) were working on civil law contracts 
in 2014, a number that has more than doubled since 2010. A further contractual category of 
employment is self-employment, where workers provide services or perform work as a 
legal subject (one-person company) for other subjects. These account for 18 per cent of 
employment in Poland.  
7.2. The platform economy 
7.2.1. Legal context 
Polish workers operate on a range of different contracts: those for an indefinite duration, 
those that are probationary in nature, and those that are fixed-term. Each has specific rights 
and entitlements under the Polish Labour Code. In addition, the Civil Code can also mean 
additional requirements for employers using labour contracts, with Civil Code contracts 
specifying a particular piece of work to be completed in a defined amount of time. As the EC 
notes, these Civil Code contracts are seen as being cheaper for employers. They have less 
social protection requirements.163   
There has been significant labour market reform in the Polish economy over the last 15 years. 
In the early 2000s, the Polish legal framework was adjusted to EU regulations. This process 
involved changes to the Labour Code and the surrounding acts, involving greater regulation 
of temporary work agencies, and more stringent requirements for the use and renewal of 
fixed term contracts. As Maciejewska and Mrozowicki note, some of these regulations actually 
weakened workers’ protection.164 The financial crisis of 2008 onwards resulted in further 
labour market reforms designed to increase labour flexibility without enforcing labour 
protection. The “Anti-crisis Act” of 2009 allowed employers to conclude an unlimited number 
of fixed term contracts in the period of 24 months, and to extend the reference period for 
calculating working time from 4 to 12 months.  
Most recently, amendments to the Labour Code have restricted the number of consecutive 
fixed-term employment contracts and their maximum duration. Moreover, these 
amendments ensure that fixed term contract workers have similar notice periods to 
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permanent employees. Social security contributions connected to some civil law contracts 
have also been increased, while draft laws seek to strengthen the role of the State Labour 
Inspectorate and introduce a minimum wage for those working on civil law contracts.165 
Platform economy workers are concentrated in self-employment in Poland and in 
freelance civil law contracts. As Chłoń-Domińczak et al.166 note, most social protection 
benefits in Poland are based on the social insurance principle. Thus, self-employed workers 
and those employed on non-standard contracts are theoretically covered by the general social 
insurance system, with contribution rates being the same for everyone, but insurance against 
some risks is voluntary. Sickness and maternity insurance, for example is voluntary for the 
self-employed and commission-contract workers. Furthermore, the social insurance system 
does not cover contracts for a specific task, which encompasses much platform work. This 
incentivises the use of civil contracts; since costs are lower for those than for regular 
employment contracts.  
Access to some benefits for platform economy workers are also limited in other areas. For 
instance, self-employed people must have paid contributions for at least 90 days to receive 
sickness benefits. Chłoń-Domińczak167 concludes that, the coverage of social protection 
benefits of self-employed workers and those on non-standard contracts in Poland 
is similar to that of labour-code workers, but lower contribution levels mean that 
their benefits are lower in practice.  
7.2.2. Development of the platform economy  
The platform economy is relatively new in Poland. One key report into the platform economy 
found that 92 per cent of internet users in Poland know about the existence of economy 
platforms. Forty-three per cent of them use at least one of the platforms. At the same time, 
the term “collaborative economy” is only known by 18.6 per cent of respondents, which 
suggests the penetration of the collaborative economy in Poland is still relatively limited.168 
A study for PWC on the collaborative economy found that 54 per cent of sharing economy 
service users in Poland claim that the main advantage of using collaborative economy 
services is price considerations, and that the total supply of peer-to-peer accommodation 
accounted for around 10 per cent of the total accommodation capacity in Poland.169 
The main sectors where the platform economy has developed are: Cars sharing in the cities 
(Uber, Car2go); city bike sharing (NextBike, Veturillo); private cars sharing (BlaBlaCar, 
jadezabiore.pl); renting an apartment or room (Airbnb, Couchsurfing); online courses 
(KhanAcademy, Coursera, Udemy, Skillshare); providing services by private individuals 
(TakeTask, Freelancer.com); coworking offices (MyMeetingRoom, BusinessLink); 
crowdfunding and loans (Kickstarter, PolakPotrafi.pl, Kokos.pl); and, the sale of food by the 
farmers (RanoZebrano.pl. LokalnyRolnik.pl, food and drink cooperatives).170  
Current policies of the Polish state are intended to grow the platform economy further. PWC 
further note that, The Polish Ministry of Development have stated that they will oppose 
regulation that “attempts to hamper the development of the collaborative economy” and is 
actively seeking to reduce administrative bureaucracy surrounding platform working.171  
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 DENMARK 
The Danish labour market is a deregulated system with low firing costs and flexible 
employment contracts. The flexible labour market is, however, compensated for by a 
generous system of social protection towards the unemployed, buttressed by unemployment 
insurance benefits in conjunction with investment in training and qualification progression of 
the unemployed. The flexicurity system remains a lynchpin of the Danish labour market. 
Workers get a high unemployment allowance supplemented by an active system of 
reintegration into the labour market. At the same time, employment relations in 
Denmark are centralised in that collective agreements set standard employment 
practices involving pay levels, sick leave, private pensions schemes and so on at 
sectoral and workplace levels. Platform economy working in Denmark should be 
understood in this specific context, unique among the European countries. 
8.1. Labour Market Trends 
Denmark was hit, like other developed economies, by the most recent economic crisis. 
Unemployment increased nearly twofold, from 3.4 per cent of the total population in 2008 to 
7.6 per cent in 2011. While employment has partially restored thereafter it has yet to reach 
the pre-crisis level, calling into the question the effectiveness of the Danish flexible labour 
market. As Table A15 shows, the employment rate is high in Denmark compared to the EU, 
and unemployment is lower than the EU average.  
Table A 15: Employment and Unemployment rates in Denmark, 2016 
 Employment Rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) 
Denmark 77.4 6.2 
EU 71.1 8.6 
Source: Eurostat 2017a172. 
Pay levels have slowed down, producing a negative trend in real earning until 2013-2014. 
Against this backdrop, Denmark still tops the list of OECD counties with high labour turnover; 
albeit this does not necessarily imply negative consequences for the workers. Despite a 
relatively high share (for Danish standards) of unemployed in the labour market, Danish 
systems of social protection are still generous, covering all workers through either active 
labour market policies or collective agreements. The key challenge relating to the platform 
economy is how to adjust it to the existing regulations of the Danish flexible labour market.  
The Danish flexicurity model is premised on flexible labour markets with limited legal 
protection countervailed by a generous universal system of social protection based on 
significant financial contributions of economic agents involving both workers and employers. 
In Denmark, national policies do not concern the shape of employment relations, leaving it 
to the parties involved: trade unions, employers and employees. There is, for example, no 
statutory minimum wage, as pay standards are set through collective agreements at the 
industry and firm level. Over 80 per cent of employees in Denmark are covered by collective 
agreements and trade unions are actively involved in social dialogue with employers and the 
government.  
Non-standard employment is well-established in Denmark, within a system that promotes 
flexicurity. As Table A16 shows, more than a quarter of the workforce are employed on a 
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part-time basis, and 12.4 per cent are in temporary jobs (the latter being similar to the EU 
average. Self-employment is relatively low.  
Table A 16: Part-time, temporary and self-employment in Denmark, 2016 
 Part-time employment (%) 
Temporary 
employment (%) Self-employment (%)  
Denmark 26.4 12.4 8 
EU 19.5 12.0 14 
Source: Eurostat 2017a; Eurostat 2017b173.  
A cornerstone of the Danish labour market is active labour market policies (ALMPs). Since 
the 1990s ALMPs have been a critical mechanism for reintegrating the unemployed and other 
disadvantaged groups into the labour market, credited with an unprecedented degree of 
success prior to the most recent economy crisis.174 The prospects of ALMPs have been called 
into question by a post-recessionary trajectory towards cutbacks in public expenditure and 
subsequent marketization of employment services.175 Yet, overall spending on ALMPs as a 
percentage of GDP is significantly higher in Denmark compared to the rest of the EU, in the 
past ten years averaging more than 3 per cent of GDP. The UK for instance spends up 0.5 
per cent of its GDP on ALMPs while the European is average is between 1.5-2 per cent.176  
ALMPs are based on the following key elements: (i) social security measures to protect 
employees during economic downturns; (ii) vocational education and training and upskilling 
to foster equilibrium in the labour market; (iii) a system of employment assistance incentives 
routed towards employers, so as to offset risks associated with hiring the unemployed.177 
Taken together, these measures render labour markets stable and cushion employees from 
abrupt spells of unemployment. The system is very much decentralised where local 
Jobcentres remain a one stop shop for employers and the unemployed, while few training 
activities are outsourced to the third parties. In Denmark, in spite of dwindling social support 
to the unemployed, two flagship programmes, namely Løntilskud and Virksomhedspraktik, 
assume direct subsidies to employers. The former is a temporary wage subsidised 
programme while the latter is a company-based placement scheme, with both being 
predicated upon full wage compensation for the programmes’ duration. 
Denmark is characterised by influential national and peak employer associations.178 Basic 
attributes of job quality in Denmark are set up through deliberations between employer 
associations, trade unions and the government at the national and sectoral level. Since the 
1980s, there has been sector-based coordination of wage bargaining,179 with Dansk 
Industriet (DI) playing a leading role in collective negotiations. Deliberations at the national 
level, which cover broader economic and political issues, are under the remit of Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforeningen (DA), a national peak association. That said, considerable power 
relating to working conditions and recruitment policies still resides at the level of workplace 
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negotiations.180 It for this main reason that the Danish system is often labelled “centralised 
decentralisation”, “organised decentralisation” and “embedded flexibilisation”.181 
8.2. The platform economy 
8.2.1. The legal context 
The effect of the platform economy on the labour market in general and on working conditions 
is mixed. Most platform economy workers in Denmark are concentrated in self-employment. 
Social protection for the self-employed and persons in non-standard jobs is 
relatively good in Denmark. Kvist182 notes that non-standard workers have the same 
access as workers in standard jobs to social protections, including healthcare, social services, 
family services, childcare, long-term care and various schemes in education and active labour 
market policies. 
Kvist also argues that for protection in the form of cash benefits, the picture is more of a 
“mixed bag”.183 For non-contributory benefits, non-standard workers enjoy the same social 
protection as other citizens (family benefits like child family allowances and child allowances, 
disability pension, national old age pension, and social assistance scheme). However, for 
contributory schemes, protection is less than for salaried workers (unemployment insurance, 
sickness benefits and work accident insurance). Workers can opt in to these schemes but 
take-up is relatively low.184 
Recent surveys indicate that workers are rather unsure in terms of their attitudes to the 
platform economy. A key problem with the platform economy is about fitting it in the 
existing system of employment relations in Denmark and a wide social safety net 
involving, in particular, ALMPs. Those workers who use the platform economy as an 
additional source of income are covered by a collective agreement in the main job and 
protected by the universal welfare system.  
Freelancers in Denmark have special contribution schemes which allow them to be covered 
by ALMPs like all other workers. It gets immensely problematic though if the platform 
economy is a sole source of income, meaning that most of the benefit enjoyed by employees 
through collective agreements are not accessible for such workers. While very few platforms 
have subscribed to industry-wide collective agreements, by and large workers in the 
platform economy are exempted from collective bargaining. With this in mind, the 
Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) has exercised a cautious approach towards the 
platform economy, with no clear-cut opposition to it. At the same time, the idea of the 
universal (basic) income is not widely supported, primarily due to the welfare state system 
in Denmark.   
8.2.2. Development of the platform economy  
The platform economy (“platformsøkonomi”, in Danish) is an emerging phenomenon in 
Denmark. Its size and impact on the national economy remains opaque, although some 
estimates suggest the platform economy accounts for around 3 per cent of employment.185  
The platform economy is broad in Denmark, with over 100 initiatives ranging from well-
known, international platforms like Uber or AirBnB, to local platforms for low- and high-skilled 
                                           
180  Due and Madsen 2008. 
181  Thelen, 2014; Traxler, 2010. 
182  Kvist 2017. 
183  Ibid.  
184  Ibid. 
185  Petropoulos 2015: 6. 
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tasks. Examples of the latter include Den Lille Tjeneste, providing help with small tasks and 
errands; and Jepti, where peers can rent out personal belongings. Uber, however, has 
announced the decision to leave Denmark because of the strict taxi regulations that has made 
its services illegal.  
Ilsoe186 points out that there is much interest amongst the state, employers and unions in 
the development of the platform economy. Unions, notes Ilsoe, have initiated dialogue with 
political parties and participated in EU level forums and debates over the platform economy. 
Unions in Denmark have also created a new pension scheme for members not covered by 
collective agreements, including freelancers, many of whom will be working in the platform 
economy. There is also, according to Ilsoe, a freelancer network.187 
 
                                           
186  Ilsoe 2017. 
187  Ibid.: 6. 
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ANNEX 2: METHODOLOGY 
This report is based on a research study conducted between December 2016 and July 2017 
by the Centre for Employment Relations Innovation and Change at the University of 
Leeds. The findings presented are based on a literature review, legal analysis, 50 interviews 
across eight countries, and a survey of 1,200 platform workers across four online platforms.    
The case studies of platform working were undertaken across the following eight countries:  
• Bulgaria 
• Denmark 
• France 
• Germany 
• Italy 
• Poland 
• Spain 
• UK 
Detail on the countries was built up using secondary documentation and literature, along with 
qualitative interviews with relevant stakeholders in each country. These interviews took place 
with representatives from business, employers, platforms and intermediaries, the 
state/government, labour/worker representatives, legal experts, practitioners, academics, 
activists and journalists.  
The interviews explored at an individual country level the nature of platforms and platform 
working, the experiences of on-line workers, social protection, labour rights, health and 
safety, career development and training. Some interviewees also commented on 
developments more widely. A snowball and purposive sampling methodology was used to 
identify respondents. A List of interviewees (anonymised) is included in Annexe 3, and a copy 
of the thematic interview guide can be found in Annexe 4.  
The survey was developed and undertaken between February and April 2017 using four online 
platforms: Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), Clickworker, CrowdFlower and Microworkers. 
These platforms are representative of microtasking: short human intelligence tasks (HITs) 
used to split more complex operations into easily performed tasks. These are put out to 
contractors/bidders, with successful bidders completing the tasks and paid on delivery. 
Examples of such micro tasks are video screening, picture matching, filling in questionnaires 
and so forth (most of the tasks take seconds or, at most, a few minutes to perform).  
The realm of the online economy is much more diverse than microtasking, involving 
professional freelance platforms like Upwork and TaskRabbit, as well as courier delivery, taxi-
driving and many other forms of work. However, as the survey findings reveal, many 
respondents registered and found work through multiple platforms, including non-
microtasking platforms. Therefore, the survey does offer wider coverage of the platform 
economy. Furthermore, it is arguable that the platforms used in the survey are of interest 
because they highlight the particular challenges that emerge in relation to the social 
protection of workers with no fixed place or time of work, who find contracts via a range of 
intermediaries and platforms.  
The survey was designed with a number of sections. Section 1 gathered personal information 
on respondents. Section 2 gathered information on the platforms that respondents worked 
through. Respondents were able to select multiple platforms and were also asked to identify 
up to 5 main platforms that they used. They also were asked to indicate how often they 
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worked in the platform economy, and how many hours a week they worked. A series of 
questions were developed to ascertain hourly income, included actual hourly rates, minimum 
rates, and perceptions of minimum rates that respondents would work for. Importantly, the 
survey also asked what proportion of personal and household income was obtained from the 
platform economy. Perceptual questions were asked about income and work in the platform 
economy. Well-validated questions from previous surveys were included that asked about 
stress, well-being and satisfaction with work. Section 3 of the survey asked respondents 
about any work they did in jobs outside the platform economy and also about experiences of 
unemployment. This section also gathered data on total personal and household income, and 
perceptions about income. Section 4 looked at experiences and perceptions towards social 
protection, both in platform economy and non-platform economy jobs. The forms of social 
protection covered are those outlined in the introduction of the report, notably protection for 
healthcare, sickness, disability, old age, pregnancy and childrearing, family caring, 
unemployment and housing. Respondents were also asked whether they felt protection as a 
platform economy worker was adequate, and what additional protection they might need.  
The survey was put together in Survey Monkey, the online survey platform. Respondents 
were gathered by registering the survey as a Human Intelligence Task on Clickworker, 
Crowdflower, Amazon Mechanical Turk and Microworkers. This was felt to be the most 
effective way of locating workers currently engaged in work in the platform economy.  The 
responses were gathered between March and April 2017. In total, 1,200 responses to the 
survey were generated, distributed equally across the four platforms. 
Analysis of the survey began with descriptive statistics, outlining the main features and 
demographic/personal characteristics of the sample. This was followed by some cross-tabular 
analysis. Latent Class Analysis (LCA) was used to recovers statistically independent clusters 
from the population in question. Clusters of platform workers were identified using current 
employment status (whether respondents had jobs (one or more) outside the platform 
economy), unemployment (whether respondents had experienced spells of unemployment in 
the past five years), reliance on platform work (the percentage contribution of platform work 
to personal income, and financial security (whether participants covered essential domestic 
payments easily or with difficulty). Further analysis was then conducted on the identified 
clusters.  
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ANNEX 3: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES (ANONYMISED) 
 
Interviewee Country Type of respondent  
Government minister for 
labour Bulgaria Government 
Confederation of Trade 
Unions representative Bulgaria Employee representative 
Confederation of trade 
unions representative Bulgaria Employee representative 
Confederation of trade 
union representative Bulgaria Employee representative 
Employer representative 
organisation Bulgaria Employer representative 
Freelancer social media 
group representative Bulgaria Business representative 
Platform co-founder Bulgaria Business representative 
Union representative Denmark Union representative 
Academic Denmark Expert 
Academic Denmark Expert 
Owner, platform provider Denmark Platform 
Lobby group/research 
centre for auto-
entrepreneurs 
France Expert 
Organisation researching 
and promoting collaborative 
economy, academic 
researcher 
France Expert/lobbying group 
Self-employer worker co-
operative France Worker representative 
Self-employed worker co-
operative France Worker representative  
Academic researcher France Expert 
Academic researcher France/Belgium Expert 
Government advisory body France Government  
Self-employed worker co-
operative France/Belgium Worker representative 
Expert on gig economy  Germany Trade union 
Expert on gig economy Germany Trade union 
Expert on self-employment Germany Trade union 
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Ministry of Labour 
representative Germany Government 
Platform founder Germany Platform 
Platform company 
representative Germany Platform  
Business association ICT Germany Business representative 
Cooperative platform  Italy Platform  
Worker on major platform, 
activist, worker 
representative 
Italy Worker representative, worker 
Journalist, expert on gig 
economy Italy Expert 
Freelance and self-
employment advocacy 
group 
Italy Worker representative 
Union spokesperson for 
union representing gig 
economy workers  
Italy Worker representative 
Researcher Poland  Expert  
Crowdwork company owner Poland  Platform 
Union representative Poland  Trade unions representative 
Trade union representative 
body Poland  Trade unions representative 
Union representative Poland  Trade unions representative 
Platform owner Poland  Platform 
Lawyer Spain Expert/employment lawyer 
Sharing platform 
organisation Spain Platform 
Employer representative Spain Employer Representative 
Academic Spain Expert 
Academic/platform owner Spain Expert/platform 
Chair, employment 
practices review UK Expert 
Recruitment industry 
representative UK Employer representative 
HR managers’ 
representative organisation UK Professional association 
Union representing gig 
economy workers UK Worker representative 
Union  UK Worker representative 
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Gig economy Worker UK Worker 
Activist, online platforms Canada Activist, worker representative 
Platform  EU 3 interviewees from leading platform  
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ANNEX 4: THEMATIC GUIDE USED IN INTERVIEWS  
1. Introduction 
Background to the project – see information sheet for details that can be used here  
Background on actor/stakeholder 
organisation 
role 
interest/involvement in issues relating to the collaborative economy and/or social protection 
 
2. Perceptions about the nature and rise of collaborative economy 
What is meant by the collaborative economy?  
What forms of work are part of the collaborative economy in your view? 
How do these differ from “traditional” standard forms of employment? In terms of hours of 
work, conditions, quality of jobs, types of activities performed, use of technology (try to draw 
out differences between different kinds) 
Perceptions of the rise of the collaborative economy (numbers, sectors, groups of workers)  
 
3.Benefits/costs of the collaborative economy for workers 
What, in your view are the benefits for workers of operating in the collaborative economy 
issues relating to pay, job quality, working conditions, flexibility, working time, security, 
skills, protection, regulation 
Draw out differences between different types of collaborative working 
 
And what about the costs/disadvantages 
 
4. Protection of workers in the collaborative economy  
How is protection organised for workers in the collaborative economy? 
Collaborative economy workers – is their status as workers? Contractors?  
Coverage/protection by law/regulations at national level: pay, working time, benefits, 
equality and diversity, maternity/paternity, health and safety, training, freedom of 
association, collective rights, welfare and benefits,  
Coverage/protection by EU-Level regulations 
Protection in practice 
- what are the challenges of protection for these workers?  
- Gaps in protection in the areas above?  
- How and why do these gaps occur?  
- job quality and the experience of work for workers in collaborative economy 
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- any specific issues that have been encountered around protection. Particular types of 
arrangement that are problematic? Particular companies/organisations/particular sectors 
- Broader effects of collaborative economy working on job quality, in-work poverty, 
unemployment? 
 
5. Perceptions around effective protection of collaborative economy workers 
- Strategies for protecting collaborative economy workers  
(may be more important for some stakeholder than others of course) 
- e.g. unions: what attempts have been used to try and improve protection for workers in 
the collaborative economy? What are the strategies that are being pursued and why? Which 
cases/organisations/platforms are you most engaged with? Where have you achieved success 
and why?  
e.g. Policy makers: what are the challenges of protecting workers in the collaborative 
economy. What particular initiatives/policies have been developed and why?  
Probe/question on the following options which may/may not improve social protection 
- a shift from contribution-based to tax-based systems;  
- basic income systems;  
- “intermediaries” like smartbe.be; which may help provide solidarities/collective identity in 
areas of the collaborative economy. Co-operative structures? Lobbying role? Role in co-
ordination?   
- personal social security accounts;  
- possible financing of activities/protection through a robot tax.  
 
 
 

